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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §§78-2-2(3)0) and 78-2a-3(2), because
this is an appeal from a judgment and final orders of the Fourth District Court over which the Utah
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Duncan, et al. agree with and adopt the Statement of Issues by Appellant Tremco
Consultants, Inc. (Tremco), but because those issues are stated in terms applicable to Tremco, these
Appellants supplement the Statement of Issues as follows:
1.

Whether the district court's Judgment and Orders that the assets of these non-party

Appellants are liable for the corporate debt of SoftSolutions, Inc. violate the due process rights of
Appellants Duncan, et ai, including the rights to notice, to be heard, to defend, and against taking
theirproperty when these Appellants were never named parties and no jurisdiction was acquired over
them or their assets. (R. 1469, 1488, 1495.)
2.

Whether the district court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that a stock purchase

agreement and the sale of the shareholders' stock was a "distribution" of corporate assets under Utah
Code Ann. § 16-1 Oa-1408 and may adjudicate shareholders' liability for a corporate debt without ever
obtaining jurisdiction over the stock sale proceeds or over the shareholders. (R. 1469,1480,1495.)
3.

Whether the district court may, as a matter of law, determine the existence of an

"unincorporated association" and adjudicate its membership without the alleged association or the
adjudicated members being named parties or allowed to appear and defend. (R. 1469,1488-7,1495.)
4.

Whether the district court can disregard the corporate structure of Appellant

SoftSolutions, Inc. and its non-party affiliate, SoftSolutions Technology Corporation ("S.T.C."), as
1

a matter of law, and then bind the assets of some (but not all) of their shareholders for the corporate
debt. (R. 1469, 1489-8, 1495.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
All of the district court's determinations were made as a matter of law and these issues are
all legal issues. This Court accords no deference to the district court's legal determinations, and will
review them de novo. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, f 14; Culbertson v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, f 11 ,44 P.3d 642; Gerbich v. Numed. Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, 1207
(Utah 1999). Summary judgment is only appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c); see Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, %6, 983 P.2d 575. This Court reviews
for correctness the district court's award of summary judgment. Nova Cas. Co., 1999 UT 69, at f6.
The legal determinations of the district court are reviewed for correctness. Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc.
v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993).

2

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1, clause 2:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Utah Constitution, Article 1, § 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405 (2001), Effect of Dissolution: Addendum 1 hereto.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408 (2001), Enforcement of Claims Against Dissolved Corporations:
Addendum 2 hereto,
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17, Parties Plaintiff and Defendant: Addendum 3 hereto.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Judgment Creditor Brigham Young University ("BYU") seeks to collect its 1998 Judgment
against a dissolved corporation, SoftSolutions, Inc., by obtaining judgment and execution upon the
assets and properties of non-Judgment Debtors and non-parties, Duncan, et al.
Course of Proceedings & Disposition Below
This Court affirmed an arbitration award and 1998 district court judgment in favor of BYU
and against Defendant/Appellant SoftSolutions, Inc. in SoftSolutions. Inc. v. Brigham Young
University. 2000 UT 46.1 P.3d 1095 (Addendum 7), based upon SoftSolutions, Inc.'s liability under
a software license agreement with Brigham Young University ("BYU") and the product sales by
SoftSolutions, Inc.'s affiliate, SoftSolutions Technology Corporation ("S.T.C.")In April, 2000, BYU brought a new and separate action against Tremco Legal Solutions, Inc.
("Tremco"), a Utah corporation, and "John Does," alleging that Tremco was liable to BYU for the
1998 SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment. BYU did not allege any "alter-ego" theory between Tremco and
the Judgment Debtor or S.T.C, but claimed, inter alia, that BYU was a beneficiary of an
indemnification agreement; that Tremco and SoftSolutions, Inc. acted as an "unincorporated
association" after SoftSolutions, Inc. was involuntarily dissolved (R. 86-86); that SoftSolutions, Inc.
fraudulently transferred its assets (R. 82-81); and, that Tremco and the unnamed Does were part of
an "association" and were liable under Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1408 because they received a
distribution of assets of SoftSolutions Technology Corporation ("S.T.C"), also anon-party. (R. 8583).
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Only Tremco was named as the defendant in the new action. Only Tremco was served with
process. (R. 101,99,96,1033.) The "Tremco action," Case No. 000400088, was consolidated with
the former "SoftSolutions, Inc. case," Case No. 960400497. (R. 386.) Tremco answered (R. 337228) and counterclaimed for damages under its own, separate license agreement with BYU. (R. 313308.)
Both BYU and Tremco argued their respective Motions for Summary Judgment in April,
2002. (R. 1033.) On May 15, 2002, the Fourth District Court issued a memorandum "Ruling,"
granting BYU's Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment, Motion to Dismiss
Counterclaim, and Motion to Strike Affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan. The Court denied Tremco's
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Ruling, R. 1052-1034; attached hereto as Addendum 4.)
A Judgment based on the Ruling was entered June 13, 2002 against Tremco for the
SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment, interest and attorney fees. (Judgment, R. 1057-1052.) The Judgment
declares that BYU was a third-party beneficiary of a contract between SoftSolutions Technology
Corporation and Tremco, Tremco was "privy" to SoftSolutions, Inc. and was bound by the 1998
SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment. (R. 1056.) The Court dismissed the Tremco counterclaim, and further
certified the Judgment final under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). (R. 1054.) The Judgment
is attached as Addendum 5.
After the June 13, 2002 Judgment was entered against Tremco, BYU filed "Supplemental
Exhibits L and M" and a proposed "Supplemental Order."

(R. 1065-82, 1139-51.)

(The

"Supplemental Order" is attached hereto as Addendum 6.) That Order expressly allowed BYU to
collect its judgment from the assets of the non-parties Duncan, et ah That Order was signed July 10,
2002.
5

Tremco filed its Notice of Appeal on July 3,2002 from the Judgment entered June 13,2002.
SoftSolutions, Inc. and non-parties Duncan, et al. filed separate Notices of Appeal, under Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure 4(d), on July 15, 2002. (Notices, R. 1413 and 1411, respectively.)
After entry of the "Supplemental Order," July 10, 2002, Tremco filed, inter alia, & Motion
to Vacate the Order on July 11, 2002. (R. 1157-55, and 1163-58.) SoftSolutions, Inc. filed an
Objection to Supplemental Order and Motion to Vacate on July 12,2002 (R. 1203-01) and a Motion
Under Rules 52, 59 and 60(b) on July 29, 2002 (R. 1496-92, 1514-1497).
Because the language of the Court's Ruling, Judgment and Supplemental Order granted BYU
further expanded relief, Duncan, et al. moved to intervene (R. 1470-67,1475-71), and filed a Motion
for Stay (R. 1477-76), and a Motion Under Rules 52, 59 and 60(b) to Vacate, etc. (R. 1481-78), all
on July 25, 2002. All post-Supplemental Order motions were argued before the Fourth District
Court, the Honorable Gary Stott, on July 22, 2003. After argument, the district court denied all of
the motions argued by both defendants and the non-party movants. No formal order has yet been
entered thereon.
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Statement of Facts
Appellants Duncan, et al and SoftSolutions, Inc. adopt and rely upon the Statement of Facts
in the Brief of Appellant Tremco. Tremco's statements and facts regarding the failures to give notice
and provide any due process are equally applicable to SoftSolutions, Inc. and, a fortiori, to Ken
Duncan, Alvin Tedjamulia and Lee Duncan, the officers and directors of Appellants SoftSolutions,
Inc. and Tremco, and to AST Associates, L.C., KWD Associates, L.C. and Julee Associates, L.C.,
who were the shareholders of SoftSolutions, Inc., SoftSolutions Technology Corporation and
Tremco.
These Appellants provide the following supplemental statement of facts particularly relevant
to them:
Appellants Julee Associates, L.C. ("Julee"), AST Associates, L.C. ("AST") and KWD
Associates, L.C. ("KWD") are each Utah limited liability companies (sometimes referred to as "the
LCs"). Each was formed initially as a limited partnership in 1982,1982 and 1979, respectively, but
converted to limited liability companies in late 1993 after adoption of the Utah Limited Liability
Company Act, Utah Code Ann. §§48-2b-101 to 158 (repealed affective July 1,2001). (R. 1390-86;
1449, at f l l . )

The limited partnerships, predecessors of the LCs, were shareholders of

SoftSolutions, Inc. and of S.T.C.
Lee A. Duncan ("L. Duncan") is a member and the manager of Julee. Alvin S. Tedjamulia
("Tedjamulia") is a member and the manager of AST. Kenneth W. Duncan ("Ken Duncan") is a
member and manager of KWD. Julee, AST and KWD each have members other than Ken Duncan,
Tedjamulia and L. Duncan.

7

Ken Duncan, Tedjamulia and L. Duncan were officers and directors of SoftSolutions, Inc.
and of S.T.C, and are currently of Tremco. (R. 830.)
In November, 1992, SoftSolutions, Inc. was involuntarily dissolved by the State of Utah for
failure to file an annual report. (R. 507.) After its involuntary dissolution, SoftSolutions, Inc. did
not carry on further business of developing or marketing software, or otherwise conduct business,
except to wind-up that corporation's affairs, including its license dispute and litigation with BYU.
(R. 1449-48.)
SoftSolutions Technology Corporation ("S.T.C"), a Utah corporation, was originally
incorporated in 1989. (R. 327-28.) From its formation in 1989 until January, 1994, KWD, AST and
Julee (first the limited partnerships, and later the LCs) were shareholders of S.T.C. In December,
1993, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the "LDS Church") also became a stockholder
of S.T.C (R. 1386.)
In January, 1994, KWD, AST, Julee and the LDS Church agreed to sell all their stock in
S.T.C. to WordPerfect Corporation. (1 P.3d 1095 at Tf4.) The transaction was a sale of stock
ownership and not a sale or transfer of any of S.T.C.'s assets. (R. 1450-49; 1218-1391.) In
exchange for its S.T.C. stock, the LDS Church received $1,085,000.00. For their respective shares
in S.T.C, KWD, AST and Julee received $13.5 Million, the balance of the stock purchase price from
WordPerfect. (R. 1338.)
In 1994, when the S.T.C. stock was sold to WordPerfect, all the assets of S.T.C remained
in S.T.C. (Duncan Aff.ffl[7-9,R. 1450-49.) No asset of S.T.C. or of SoftSolutions, Inc. "changed
hands" and no asset of S.T.C was distributed to any shareholder. After February, 1994, S.T.C

8

continued its corporate existence With all its assets intact. All of its stock was then owned by
WordPerfect Corporation. (Duncan Aff.ffi[7-9,R. 1450-49.)
Because of the potential liability in 1994 of SoftSolutions, Inc. (and, under the license
agreement, its "affiliate" S.T.C), S.T.C. established a fund for BYU royalties, in the event royalties
were determined due. S.T.C. maintained that fond even after its stock shares were purchased by
WordPerfect. (Duncan Aff. Iff 6 and 10, R. 1450-49.) At about the time of the 1996 SoftSolutions,
Inc. arbitration award, the S.T.C royalty contingency account contained approximately $950,000.00.
(A. Tedjamulia Aff. f6, R. 1454.)
BYU never made any claim against SoftSolutions, Inc.'s affiliate corporation, S.T.C, to
recover the SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment. (R. 96.) Eventually, the "royalty contingency" account
was terminated and absorbed by Novell Corp., after its purchase of WordPerfect Corp.
None of the officers or the limited liability shareholders carried on any business as
SoftSolutions, Inc. after its involuntary dissolution in 1992, except to litigate the claim of BYU.
The underlying 1998 Judgment was entered against SoftSolutions, Inc. and only against
SoftSolutions, Inc. ("1998 Judgment"). SoftSolutions, Inc. appealed that Judgment to this Court,
Case No. 981481. SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 2000 UT 46, 1 P.3d 1095.
Only SoftSolutions, Inc. and BYU were the parties in that case. No claim or action was ever brought
against S.T.C, WordPerfect, or others. Neither the Duncan individuals nor the limited liability
companies were ever named parties by BYU in any proceeding or served with process in their
individual capacities.
When, in 2000, BYU initiated the second case against Tremco, case No. 000400088 (the
"2000 Case"), seeking to make Tremco liable to pay the 1998 Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc.,
9

Duncan, et al. were never named as parties, were never served with process, and no justiciable claim
against them was alleged. (R. 96-91.) Although Plaintiffs Complaint alleged that the Duncan
individuals controlled an alleged "unincorporated association," that "association" was never a named
or served party in the Tremco lawsuit. (R. 96-90.)
No natural or corporate person other than Tremco has ever been named as a party defendant
in the instance case. No natural or corporate person other than Tremco was served with summons.
(R2000, 99-101.)
When BYU and Tremco filed cross motions for summary judgment in the Tremco case,
BYU's motion was served only upon the attorney for Tremco. BYU did not serve its motions and
memoranda upon SoftSolutions, Inc., its attorney, or upon Ken Duncan, Tedjamulia, L. Duncan,
AST, KWD, Julee, individually. (R. 846, 853, 959.) Despite BYU's demands in its motions to
pursue what it labeled as a "sale of assets," BYU never joined S.T.C. or its shareholders as parties.
The district court never acquired any jurisdiction, in rem or otherwise, over the payments by
WordPerfect or the payees.
Later, when the district court heard oral argument on the summaryjudgment motions of BYU
and Tremco on April 10, 2002 (R. 1033), notice of the hearing was not provided to counsel for
SoftSolutions, Inc. or to Duncan, et al (R. 1008.) In its May 14, 2002 "Ruling" (Addendum 4
hereto), the district court concluded that SoftSolutions, Inc., Tremco and S.T.C. were all part of an
"unincorporated association." (R. 1004-46.) Without findings, the Court determined that the sale
of S.T.C. shares to WordPerfect was a sale and fraudulent transfer or distribution of assets.
Therefore, BYU could pursue the proceeds of the sale of S.T.C. shares, owned by non-parties, to
collect the SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment. (R. 1042-43.)
10

On June 24,2002, BYU filed two additional exhibits (termed "Exhibits L and M" by BYU);
Exhibit M showed payments by WordPerfect to the LCs for the stock purchase. (R. 1136-38.)
Again, BYU's submissions were not served upon the individuals, the LCs, or SoftSolutions, Inc.'s
counsel - only upon Tremco's counsel. (R. 1136, 1140.)
With its motion, BYU submitted a proposed order, relying upon BYU's new Exhibits L and
M, which greatly expanded the June 13,2002 Judgment by "finding" that, individually, Duncan, et
al. - who had never been made parties to this action nor served with any process - were also
members of the supposed "unincorporated association," the debt of SoftSolutions, hie, was also the
debt of an "unincorporated association," and the stock sale proceeds were association assets.
Therefore, according to the Order, BYU could enforce its judgments against any proceeds that the
LCs had received from the sale of their S.T.C. shares to WordPerfect in 1994. (R. 1139-51.)
Duncan, et al were found jointly and personally liable for the SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment. (R.
1143.) The July 10,2002 Order further authorized BYU to execute on property owned by "any other
person" that is traceable to proceeds from the sale of S.T.C. shares. (R. 1142.)
Tremco, SoftSolutions, Inc. and Duncan, et al. each timely filed separate appeals from the
June 13, 2002 Judgment. (R. 1412-15.)
On July 25,2002, Duncan, et al moved to intervene and joined in Tremco's motion to stay
enforcement of the Supplemental Order and the Judgment. Duncan, et al and SoftSolutions, Inc.
also filed objections to and motions to vacate the July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order timely under
Rules 52, 59 and 60(b) to suspend the finality of that Order.
On July 22,2003, Judge Stott heard oral argument on the Appellants' objections and motions
to vacate the July 10,2002 Order, and motions for stay of execution pending resolution of the appeal.
11

Judge Stott denied the motions to vacate and the motions for a stay, ruling from the bench that
Duncan, et al.'s due process rights had not been violated by entry of the July 10,2002 Supplemental
Order authorizing execution on Duncan, et a/.'s property to satisfy the Judgments against Tremco
and SoftSolutions, Inc., because there was a commonality of officers (Ken Duncan, Tedjamulia, and
L. Duncan) between the entities, and service upon one member of the alleged association was
sufficient for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over SoftSolutions, Inc. 's and Tremco's shareholders
and officers.
Judge Stott also denied Duncan, et aVs Motion to Intervene because their individual interests
had been adequately represented by the corporate Judgment Debtors. No order has yet been entered
denying these motions.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Judgment and the resulting July 10, 2002 Order by the district court were entered in
violation of the fundamental right to constitutional due process of law to which all persons are
entitled, including the officers and shareholders of SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco. The Judgment
and Supplemental Order allow BYU to execute on property both inside and outside the State of Utah
that is owned by non-judgment debtor third-parties who have never been named defendants in any
complaint by BYU, have never been served any summons bringing them personally within the
jurisdiction of the Fourth District Court in Utah County, were never served the motions on which
the July 10,2002 Supplemental Order was based, and were never provided opportunity to be heard
on their individual liability to BYU or to defend. The entire basis for the district court's rulings is
fatally flawed and void.
The Court's Judgment contradicts fundamental principles of constitutional due process and
established precedence of limited corporate liability by disregarding the separate corporate existences
of both defendant corporations, "piercing" their corporate veils and by a novel theory of an
"association" to require payment for corporate debts by their their shareholders and officers (and by
other non-party corporate entities). BYU has neither pled nor proven any claim for alter-ego
liability, or indeed properly invoked jurisdiction over the non-parties or their assets.
Simply, Tremco's and SoftSolutions, Inc.'s shareholders' and officers' fundamental rights
to due process of law under the State and Federal Constitutions have been and continue to be
violated. The Court's Judgment and Supplemental Order are void as against these Appellants, and
should be reversed.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT AND THE JULY 10, 2002 ORDER ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE THEY DEPRIVE DUNCAN, ET AL..
NON-PARTY CORPORATE OFFICERS AND SHAREHOLDERS,
OF THEIR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
The gravamen of this appeal is that the Tremco Judgment and the Supplemental Order are
a clear unconstitutional denial of due process of law as against Duncan, et al In conjunction, they
authorize BYU to execute against the real and personal property of the shareholders and officers of
the defendant corporations, even though the officers and shareholders were never named as
defendants in any action, never served a summons bringing them within the jurisdiction of the Fourth
District Court, never served BYU's motions resulting in the Order, and never provided a meaningful
opportunity to be heard on the asserted ownership of their assets. The Utah and United States
Constitutions each prohibit depriving persons of their property without due process of law. U.S.
Const., Amend. XIV, §1; Utah Const., Art. 1, §7; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972). The
State and Federal due process clauses have well-established requirements that must be satisfied
before a judgment is imposed against a person.
Due process requires a person be named a party to an action before being held liable to pay
a judgment rendered in that action. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
110 (1960). Due process requires a person be served a summons and brought within a court's
jurisdiction before that court may exercise and render judgment. Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe
Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344,350 (1999) ("In the absence of service of process (or waiver of service
by a defendant), a court may not exercise power over a party the complaint names as a defendant.");
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see Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 110. A fortiori, the court has no jurisdiction to exercise power
over unserved persons not even named as defendants.
Due process requires a person be provided notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard
on an issue, before that issue is decided adverse to him. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah
1990) ('Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are at the
very heart of procedural fairness." citation omitted); Bunnell v. Industrial Comm'n., 740 P.2d 1331,
1334 (Utah 1987).
These are absolute minimum and basic requirements of due process. As the United States
Supreme Court has explained:
It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam
resulting from litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to
which he has not been made a party by service of process. The
consistent constitutional rule has been that a court has no power to
adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1960) (emphasis added).
Moreover, these jurisdictional notice requirements are necessary safeguards that cannot simply be
brushed under the carpet.
"[WJhere a jurisdictional notice is required to be given in a certain
manner, any means other than that prescribed is ineffective. This
is so even though the intended recipient of that notice does in fact
acquire the knowledge contemplated by the law. Such a rule is no
mere 'legal technicality5 rather it is a fundamental safeguard
assuring each citizen that he will be afforded due process of law. Nor
may the requirement be relaxed merely because of a showing that
certain complaining parties did have actual notice of the proceeding."
Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment. 598 P.2d 1339, 1345 (Utah 1979) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
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It is axiomatic that a court acquires the power to adjudicate by proper service of process
which imparts notice to the defendant he is being sued, and must appear and defend. "In that manner
a court acquires jurisdiction to enter ajudgment against a party." Myers v. Interwest Corp.. 632 P.2d
879, 880 (Utah 1981). Actual service of process is jurisdictional. Mere actual knowledge of an
action or claim cannot suffice. Service of process is required to confer jurisdiction and cannot be
supplanted by other means. In the absence of service of process, a court does not have jurisdiction
to render its judgment, even though the defendant corporation has notice of the action. Murdock v.
Blake. 484 P.2d 164,167 (Utah 1971).
The June Judgment and the July Supplemental Order were entered without service or
bringing Duncan, et al before the court, and without jurisdiction to affect the property and rights of
Duncan, et al. It is of no consequence whether the July Supplemental Order was entered as an
enforcement order "in supplemental proceedings" of the SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment or the 2002
Tremco Judgment or, as we believe, an appealable order in its own right. Both are void.
The Court's Ruling and Judgment are based upon factual assumptions made without
jurisdiction and contrary to the evidence. The July Supplemental Order also makes specific findings
of fact, even though no evidentiary hearing was held by Judge Howard. The Court's rulings are
unquestionably adverse to Messrs. Duncan, Tedjamulia and Duncan, and to the corporate entities
KWD, AST and Julee. Based upon the Judgment and the "findings," the Court authorizes BYU to
levy on any and all property received by the three natural persons and three corporate entities from
the 1994 stock sale to WordPerfect to satisfy the 1998 Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. (R.
1143-42.) The Court has determined that separate assets of Duncan, et al are "property of the
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unincorporated association." The Court had no power over the property or the persons to make such
an adjudication.
The record is clear that the individuals and corporate entities adversely affected, Duncan, et
al.9 were never made parties to any action against BYU or brought within the Court's jurisdiction.
They were not parties to the 1990 License Agreement with BYU, containing the arbitration clause.
They were not parties to the arbitration brought pursuant to that clause. They were not named parties
or served in the 1996 case between SoftSolutions, Inc. and BYU. They were neither named parties
nor served any summons in the 2000 case between BYU and Tremco. And, they were never served
with BYU's motions or documents resulting in the Judgment or the Supplemental Order.
In Zenith Radio, the US. Supreme Court held that even when a corporate defendant
stipulates to its parent corporation being treated the same as the subsidiary for purposes of the
litigation, it violates that parent's right to due process of law to impose upon the parent a judgment
rendered against the subsidiary. 395 U.S. at 109-10.
Due process is not satisfied merely because the individuals were officers or AST, KWD and
Julee were shareholders of SoftSolutions, Inc. or of S.T.C, also never a party. Due process is also
not satisfied merely because Ken Duncan, Tedjamulia and L. Duncan were involved in or directed
the arbitration and litigation proceedings as officers of SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco. As the
Zenith Radio Court explained, even if the parent "through its officer . . . in fact controlled the
litigation on behalf of [the subsidiary], and if the claim were made that the judgment against [the
subsidiary] would be res judicata against [the parent], that claim itself could be finally adjudicated
against [the parent] only in a court with jurisdiction over that company." Id. at 111 (emphasis
added).
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Due process is not satisfied because the assets BYU now seizes are somehow traceable to
proceeds of the sale of S.T.C. stock. Indeed, BYU seeks to execute upon real and personal property
located outside the State of Utah and which are owned by other successors in interest to KWD. BYU
has filed its Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. in Montana for that very purpose because the
Montana properties are proceeds of the sale of S.T.C. stock. The district court must have personal
jurisdiction over the owner of that property, or the property itself, and a justiciable claim to affect
title to that property. Pennover v. Neff 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1877). When title and ownership of
property itself are questioned, the property must be brought before the court and the court must
acquire control over both the subject property and the parties. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n v.
Wooras, 97 Utah 351, 364-5, 93 P.2d 455 (1939). Jurisdiction is acquired by filing a sufficient
complaint and proper service. And when jurisdiction is not acquired, the judgment is void.
The denial of the due process right of non-parties Duncan, et al. by the entry of a judgment
or order affecting them or their property is clear. The Tremco Judgment and any Supplemental
Order based thereon are void and must be vacated.
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE
ENTITIES AND BY HOLDING DUNCAN, ET AL. AND THEIR ASSETS
JOINTLY LIABLE FOR THE CORPORATE DEBT
The Tremco Judgment and the Supplemental Order should be reversed because they blatantly
contradict binding precedent of this Court that a shareholder or officer of a corporation is not liable
to pay a corporate debt unless it is proven that the shareholder or officer is the corporation's alterego. This Court has repeatedly stated that "a corporation is regarded as a legal entity, separate and
apart from its stockholders." Dockstader v. Walker, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973); accord
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc.. 789 P.2d 24,26 (Utah 1990). Only
when a third party proves (1) such unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its
shareholder or officer that the separate personalities no longer exist, and (2) observance of the
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice or an inequitable result may a court
disregard a corporation's separate existence. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc., 789 P.2d, at 26
(citations omitted). Stated simply, the district court does not have "carte blanche to refuse to
recognize the legal separation of shareholder and corporation," even where such recognition "would
in some way prevent a creditor of a controlling shareholder from quickly being made whole." Id.
The Judgment and Supplemental Order disregard the separate corporate existences of
SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco by making their officers and shareholders pay the Judgments against
SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco rendered upon the individual corporate debt of only SoftSolutions,
Inc. In this case, BYU has never pled any theory, offered any evidence, or met its burden to prove
the elements of alter-ego liability of Duncan, et al. In the absence of such pleading and proof, any
adjudication of officer or shareholder liability is prejudicial error. Without any pleading or proof of
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alter-ego liability, such wholesale nullification of Tremco's and SoftSolutions, Inc.'s corporate
existence is flatly contrary to precedent.
"Ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a separate and distinct legal
entity from its stockholders." Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370,
510 P.2d 526, 528 (1973). The purpose of such separation is to
insulate the stockholders from the liabilities of the corporation, thus
limiting their liability to only the amount that the stockholders
voluntarily put at risk. [Citation omitted.] Courts must balance
piercing and insulating policies and will only reluctantly and
cautiously pierce the corporate veil. [Citations omitted.]
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42,46 (Ut. App. 1988). "A key feature of the
alter ego theory is that it is an equitable doctrine requiring that each case be determined upon its
peculiar facts." Id at 47. In this case, BYU did not allege the alter-ego liability of the directors and
shareholders of the defendant corporations. No claim was ever stated against them, much less
factually proved. Neither were they made parties before the Court, nor served.
Limited corporate liability is not just an historic principle to be cast aside to remedy a
creditor's demand. As one commentator has explained, limited corporate liability is vital because
it
promote[s] commerce and industrial growth by encouraging
shareholders to make capital contributions to corporations without
subjecting all of their personal wealth to the risks of the business.
This incentive to business investment has been called the most
important legal development of the nineteenth century.
David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil 17 Willamette L. Rev. 371, 371-73 (1981); accord
James Constructors, 761 P.2d at 46«n. 9. "In fact, limited liability is one of the principal purposes
for which the law has created the corporation." 1 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations §41.20 at 596-97 (1999); accord 18 C I S . Corporations §16 (1990) ('The law permits
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the incorporation of a business for the very purpose of escaping personal liability . . . ."); Barber,
supra, at 373 ("[C]"ourts of every jurisdiction have recognized the legitimacy of incorporating to
avoid personal liability.").
BYU's creative allegation of an "unincorporated association" of corporations, officers and
shareholders may be creative, but is still allegation. Even under the facts BYU argues, it is
inappropriate to find such an association as a matter of law. The defendant's corporate officers acted
as officers and directors of the corporation for which they acted. The entity shareholders did not
exceed their bounds as shareholders. There is not even any demonstrated fact by BYU that it was
at all confused or mislead by corporate officers or shareholders.
Certainly, the officers of SoftSolutions, Inc., and later Tremco, substantially participated in
and directed the litigations with BYU, as officers and directors. It was their fiduciary duty to do so.
However, acting as officers and directors does not bind them individually, or bind shareholders.
Otherwise, a corporate veil could never exist when any officer or directors was also a shareholder.
Because a person participates in a representative capacity in litigation does not bind that
person, individually, by the determinations made.
The protection of limited liability to corporate officers and shareholders was erroneously cast
aside by the lower court without any factual or legal basis.
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POINT III
THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY ADJUDICATED
DUNCAN, ETAL. AND THEIR ASSETS
AS PART OF AN "UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION"
The Judgment below and the Supplemental Order purport to adjudicate the personal assets
of Duncan, et al. to be the assets of an "unincorporated association." Not having either the assets
or the owners before the Court, the Court could not properly adjudicate whether Appellants Duncan,
et al. were "members" of the so-called association or that their assets were association assets.
There is no evidence before the Court to support its determination as a matter of law that
individuals Duncan and Tedjamulia, or KWD, AST or Julee ever negotiated or entered into any
agreement with BYU or transacted business under any common, unincorporated name. Messrs.
Duncan and Tedjamulia acted as the officers and directors of the respective corporations. BYU's
conclusions are based solely on its innuendo and argument. There is no evidence that after
SoftSolutions, Inc. dissolved, Messrs. Duncan and Tedjamulia acted on its behalf other than as its
officers to wind-up its dispute with BYU. These individuals never acted for S.T.C. or Tremco,
respectively, except in their corporate officer capacities.
The phantomized unincorporated association found by the Court was never named or sued
as required by Rule 17(d), Utah R. Civil P. The Rule does not create a cause of action against or
right to sue a fictitious entity. The Rule is merely one of procedure regarding established business
association relationships. If BYU believed that this "unincorporated association" existed and was
liable, it should have sued that business association, named it as a party and submitted proof, not
innuendo. That is what Rule 17(d), Utah R. Civil P., contemplates in order for a court to acquire
jurisdiction over the alleged association. However, BYU did not sue the association. BYU has only
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attempted to use the theory to expand its judgment against a corporate debtor to non-parties and
obtain relief against the non-parties' assets without an opportunity for the non-parties to appear and
defend the allegations.
A mere business relationship between entities does not signal an unincorporated association.
Rule 17 contemplates otherwise. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 895 P.2d 839 (Utah App. 1995)
held that two property owners did not transact business or hold themselves out for business under
the common name of the property. In this case, there is no evidence of partnership, joint venture or
sharing of corporate resources between SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco, or with their officers or
shareholders.
Moreover, BYU and the Judgment ignore the express language of Rule 17(d). Even
assuming there was an unincorporated association (which there is not), the "separate property of an
individual member of the association may not be bound by the judgment unless the member is named
as a party and the Court acquires jurisdiction over the member." Rule 17(d), Utah R. Civil P.; see
also MacKav v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 947 (Utah 1998). Just as in Hardy, there is no evidence here that
Messrs. Duncan and Tedjamulia, or the limited liability companies, acted in any association or joint
venture-type relationship. The individuals' actions as officers of the Judgment Debtor, or of S.T.C.,
or even as managers of the stockholders, does not, as a matter of law, subject their assets to liability
for corporate debts. Even after a corporation is dissolved, the actions of its officers, expressly
authorized by statute, do not form a basis for an "unincorporated association."
The district court Ruling allows BYU to satisfy its debt from association assets, but then
decrees that assets owned by the non-parties are really the "association" assets, all without allowing
the owner and title-holder of those assets to appear and defend their ownership. In PGM, Inc v.
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Westchester Investment Partners. 2Q00 UT APP 020,995 P.2d 1252 (Ut. App. 2000), the Utah Court
of Appeals properly held that res judicata and "issue preclusion" could not preclude PGM, Inc. from
challenging an alter-ego determination in a prior proceeding to which it was not a party. Similar to
the instant case, a prior court, in PGM, Inc., had purported to adjudicate the liability of non-party
PGM as an alleged alter-ego of the Paria Company, "even though PGM was not named, was not
served, and did not appear in the Paria litigation." 995 P.2d at 1254. In a collateral action by PGM,
the appeals court affirmed PGM's right to challenge the prior determination of liability as not
binding upon it. The appellate court relied, in part, upon the United States Supreme Court in Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research. Inc., 395 U.S. 100,110-11, 89 S.Ct. 1562,1569-70 (1969) that:
"It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam resulting from litigation in which
he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process." In
the instant matter, this principle applies equally to the individual assets of the LCs as the
shareholders of S.T.C. and to the corporate officers. It also makes no difference whether a court's
power to proceed is in personam or in rem, or whether the legal theory is "alter-ego" or
"association." The property of Duncan, et al. cannot be taken or adjudicated without making them
a party and properly stating a claim.
Applying the same due process principle in reverse, in Hittslev v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024
(Utah 1987) this Court reversed a district court award that substantially benefitted a non-party.
"Courts can generally make a legally binding adjudication only between the parties actually joined
in the action." Id. at 1025. See also R.M.S. Corp. v. Baldwin, 576 P.2d 881, 883 (Utah 1998) (No
judgment could be entered when the corporation was not before the court); and State, ex relHJ, 1999
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UT APP 238, 986 P.2d 115 (Utah App. 1999) (A grandmother had no notice that a hearing on
temporary custody would also resolve adoption issues).
The legal predicates for an unincorporated associations such as a partnership or association
certainly do not allow the Court to create such an association relationship here as a matter of law and
without evidence, and then allow seizure of personal assets.

The facts that Tremco paid

SoftSolutions, Inc.'s legal fees or that S.T.C. stockholders sold their stock to WordPerfect do not
support a "piercing" of the corporate veil and adjudicating liability of officers and shareholders, or
their assets. There was no evidence before the trial court that the officers/directors of SoftSolutions,
Inc. continued the business of that corporation outside of directing and managing the BYU litigation.
SoftSolutions, Inc. was allowed to dissolve because it did not do any business. All software
business, development or sales were being done by S.T.C. under an assignment. Using BYU's
theories and the Court's rationale, the LDS Church and BYU's Board of Trustees might well be
personally liable for BYU's obligations by providing financial support to both and by acting in dual
governing capacities.
BYU is availed nothing by.arguing that the individuals and the LCs knew or should be
imputed knowledge that BYU asserted claims against them or their assets personally. There is no
showing that they attended any hearing or acted in any capacity other than as corporate officers.
Jurisdiction over them, personally, or their property is not acquired by their actions as officers or by
waiver. Attending a hearing as an officer of the defendant corporation when the corporation is the
only defendant cannot be translated into jurisdiction over or due process against the officer
personally or his personal assets.

25

BYU disregards the "corporate veil" of SoftSolutions, Inc. by arguing the officers and
shareholders continued to conduct business by litigating with BYU. However, Utah Code Ann. §1610a-1405(1) expressly contemplates a "winding-up" of affairs and the "liquidating" of business for
dissolved corporations. However, dissolution did not prevent SoftSolutions, Inc. Jfrom suing or being
sued. Section 16-10a-1405(2). By defending itself in the arbitration and before Ihe district court to
dispute BYU's royalty claims, SoftSolutions, Inc. did not act beyond its corporate authority, and its
officers and shareholders did not become an amorphous "unincorporated association." The sales of
software products and the royalty obligations incurred by S.T.C., as SoftSolutions, Inc.'s "affiliate"
under the license agreement, as adjudicated in 1998, increased the liability of SoftSolutions, Inc. to
BYU, but there is no factual or legal basis, alleged or shown, here to substantiate that SoftSolutions,
Inc. continued to "do business" or acted in "an association."
Finally, BYU has glibly misrepresented in written and oral arguments that the sale of S.T.C.
stock was a "distribution of corporate assets" by a dissolved under Utah Code Ann. §§16-10a1421(3) and 16-10a-1408(2). S.T.C. was never a "dissolved corporation." Neither SoftSolutions,
Inc. nor S.T.C. distributed any assets to shareholders. At the time of its 1992 dissolution,
SoftSolutions, Inc. had no assets and distributed none. At the time of the stock sale in 1994, S.T.C.
continued to exist with substantial assets, including the reserved fund for the then-unadjudicated
BYU license liability. The 1994 S.T.C. stock sale to WordPerfect was clearly and unambiguously,
on its face and in fact, a purchase and sale of the shareholders' stock shares, wherein KWD, AST,
Julee and the LDS Church sold all their shares in S.T.C. to WordPerfect. (R. 1265.) The conclusory
characterization that, as a matter of law, the sale was a fraudulent distribution of corporate assets was
error and without factual basis. That ruling erroneously formed the foundation for the false
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characterization of the stock sale proceeds as "joint association assets." Even aside from the
jurisdiction and due process issues, the lower court's ruling that stock sale proceeds were
"association" assets was in error.
The Appellant officers and shareholders of SoftSolutions, Inc. and S.T.C. are not liable for
the coiporate obligation of SoftSolutions, Inc., S.T.C. or Tremco. Their assets cannot be held or
adjudicated to satisfy the corporate debts of SoftSolutions, Inc. or of Tremco. This Court should
reverse any judgment in this matter against these Appellants and their assets.
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CONCLUSION
Before this Court is a simple case of the individuals' basic rights of due process and the
application of basic limited liability for corporate debts.
SoftSolutions, Inc., a Utah corporation, contracted with BYU to license a software algorithm.
The license was sub-licensed by SoftSolutions, Inc. to a separate but affiliated corporation, S.T.C,
to be included as one component into a larger product developed by S.T.C. Royalties were paid to
BYU for a period of time until a dispute arose over whether BYU was fulfilling its part of the license
contract.
In 1992, SoftSolutions, Inc., the original licensee, was deemed by the stockholders to not be
serving any valid purpose, and its corporate charter was allowed to expire.
In 1996, BYU claimed unpaid royalties against SoftSolutions, Inc., even though the public
records then showed that SoftSolutions, Inc. was dissolved and had ceased doing business. BYU
chose not to pursue the affiliated corporation, S.T.C, which had used the license, assumed the
royalty obligation, and had assets. Ownership of S.T.C. was subsequently sold to WordPerfect
Corporation and continued as a subsidiary of that corporation for a substantial period. Subsequent
to the sale of S.T.C stock to WordPerfect, BYU was awarded its Judgment against SoftSolutions,
Inc.
All of the corporate entities named are, or were, valid corporate entities recognized by the
State of Utah when they transacted business. The officers transacted the respective corporate
businesses within their fiduciary duties.
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After B YU acquired its Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc., it filed another lawsuit against
a totally different corporation, Tremco. No claim or cause of action was made against Appellants
Duncan, et al.
A basic corporate law case has been convoluted into a legal aberration by BYU against any
entity or person it chooses, regardless of corporate structures and individual rights. BYU advances
changing theories of "unincorporated association," fraudulent transfer and "sale of corporate assets"
which are without factual or legal basis in this case. How is this possible? Apparently, in BYU's
backyard, BYU is king, and the king can do no wrong.
This Court should hold BYU within the bounds of due process and recognized corporate
principles. The Judgments and Orders against the non-corporate Appellants and their assets are void.
The sale of S.T.C. stock was not a fraudulent transfer or "sale of assets." These Appellants did not
act or do business as some amorphous, unincorporated, loose association.
The Judgment and Supplemental Order are void and unenforceable as to these Appellants.
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ADDENDA

_#

Description

1.

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405 (2001), Effect of Dissolution

2.

Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1408 (2001), Enforcement of Claims Against Dissolved
Corporations

3.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17, Parties Plaintiff and Defendant

4.

May 15,2002 Ruling Re: 1) Plaintiffs Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial
Summary Judgment; 2) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; 3) Plaintiffs
Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim; 4) Plaintiffs Objection to and Motion to
Strike Affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan; and 5) Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion

5.

June 13, 2002 Judgment

6.

July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order

7.

SoftSolutions. Inc. v. Brigham Young University. 2000 UT 46, 1 P.2d 1095

Tabl

REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT

16-10a-1405

16-10a-1405. Effect of dissolution.
(1) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not
carry on any business except t h a t appropriate to wind up and liquidate its
business and affairs, including:
(a) collecting its assets;
(b) disposing of its properties t h a t will not be distributed in kind to its
shareholders;
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its liabilities;
(d) distributing its remaining property among its shareholders according to their interests; and
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and liquidate its business
and affairs.
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not:
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property;
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, although the authorization to dissolve may provide for closing the corporation's share transfer
records;
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of conduct different from
those prescribed in Part 8;
(d) change:
(i) quorum or voting requirements for its board of directors or
shareholders;
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or removal of its directors
or officers or both; or
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its articles of incorporation;
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name;
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against the corporation
on the effective date of dissolution; or
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of the corporation.
History: C. 1953, 16-10a-1405, enacted by
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 156.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Directors
—Authority
Liability after dissolution
Partnerships
Trust fund doctrine
Quiet title action
Directors.
—Authority.
Board of directors m winding up affairs of
corporation on forfeiture of its charter had
authority to confess judgment on indebtedness
of the corporation Hennod v East Tmtic Dev
Co, 52 Utah 245, 173 P 134 (1918)

Liability after dissolution.
Officers and directors who continue the business of a suspended corporation which has not
been reinstated are personally liable for all
debts and liabilities arising from those operations t h a t are a continuation of the types of
activities the corporation performed Steenbhk
v Lichfield, 906 P2d 872 (Utah 1995) (decided
under former § 16-10-139)
Persons who act as if pursuant to valid corporate authority, after that authority has been
suspended, are personally responsible for liabilities arising from the continued operations,
and are jointly and severally liable with others
who know the corporation's authonty is no
longer effective but continue its operations
Steenbhk v Lichfield, 906 P2d 872 (Utah 1995)
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16- 10a-1408

(6) For purposes of this section, "claim" does not include a contingent
liability or a claim based on an event occurring after the effective date of
dissolution.
History: C. 1953,16~10a~1406. enacted b y
L. 1992, ch. 277, * 157.

16-10a-1407.

Disposition of claims by publication.

(1) A dissolved corporation may publish notice of its dissolution and request
that persons with claims against the corporation present them m accordance
with the notice
(2) The notice contemplated in Subsection (1) must:
(a) be published one time in a newspaper of general circulation in the
county where the dissolved corporation's principal office or, if it has no
principal office in this state, its registered office is or was last located;
(b) describe the information that must be included in a claim and
provide an address at which any claim must be given to the corporation;
and
(c) state that unless sooner barred by any other statute limiting actions,
the claim will be barred if an action to enforce the claim is not commenced
within five years after the publication of the notice.
(3) If the dissolved corporation publishes a newspaper notice in accordance
with Subsection (2), then unless sooner barred under Section 16-10a-1406 or
under any other statute limiting actions, the claim of any claimant against the
dissolved corporation is barred unless the claimant commences an action to
enforce the claim against the dissolved corporation within five years after the
publication date of the notice.
(4) (a) For purposes of this section, "claim" means any claim, including
claims of this state, whether known, due or to become due, absolute or
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other
legal basis, or otherwise.
(b) For purposes of this section, an action to enforce a claim includes
any civil action, and any arbitration under any agreement for binding
arbitration between the dissolved corporation and the claimant.
History: C. 1953,16-10a-1407, enacted by
L. 1992, ch. 277, *> 158.

16-10a~1408. Enforcement of claims against dissolved
corporations.
A claim may be enforced:
(1) tinder Section 16-10a-14Q6 or 16-10a~1407 against the dissolved
corporation, to the extent of its undistributed assets; or
(2) against a shareholder of the dissolved corporation, if the assets have
been distributed in liquidation; but a shareholder's total liability for all
claims under this section may not exceed the total value of assets
distributed to him, as that value is determined at the time of distribution.
Any shareholder required to return any portion of the value of assets
received by him in liquidation shall be entitled to contribution from all
other shareholders. The contributions ^hall be m accordance with the
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shareholders'respective rights and interests and may not exceed the value
of the assets received in liquidation.
History: C. 1953,16-10a-1408, enacted by
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 159; 1996, ch. 79, § 17.

16-10a-1409. Service on dissolved corporation.
(1) A dissolved corporation shall either:
(a) maintain a registered agent in this state to accept service of process
on its behalf; or
(b) be deemed to have authorized service of process on it by registered
or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the address of its principal
office, if any, as set forth in its articles of dissolution or as last changed by
notice delivered to the division for filing or to the address for service of
process that is stated in its articles of dissolution or as last changed by
notice delivered to the division for filing.
(2) Service effected pursuant to Subsection (1Kb) is perfected at the earliest
of:
(a) the date the dissolved corporation receives the process, notice, or
demand;
(b) the date shown on the return receipt, if signed on behalf of the
dissolved corporation; or
(c) five days after mailing.
(3) Subsection (1) does not prescribe the only means, or necessarily the
required means, of service on a dissolved corporation.
History: C. 1953,16-10a-1409, enacted by
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 160.

16-10a-1420. Grounds for administrative dissolution.
The division may commence a proceeding under Section 16- 10a-1421 for
administrative dissolution of a corporation if:
(1) the corporation does not pay when they are due any taxes, fees, or
penalties imposed by this chapter or other applicable laws of this state;
(2) the corporation does not deliver a corporate or annual report to the
division when it is due;
(3) the corporation is without a registered agent or registered office in
this state;
(4) the corporation does not give notice to the division that its registered
agent or registered office has been changed, that its registered agent has
resigned, or that its registered office has been discontinued; or
(5) the corporation's period of duration stated in its articles of incorporation expires.
History: C. 1953,16-10a-1420, enacted by
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 161.
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msms. 86 A L R Fed 211
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 16i0
Federal Rules of Cml Procedure for faibng to
obe> scheduling or pretrial order 90 A L R
Fed 157.

Consideration at trial, undei Rule 16 of Fedeial Rules of Civil Procedure of issues not fixed
for trial m pretrial order 117 \ L R Fed olo

PAKT IV. PARTIES
Rule 17. P a r t i e s plaintiff a n d defendant.
(a) Real party in interest Every action shall be prosecuted m the name of the
real party m interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of
an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been
made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue m
t h a t person's name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is
brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of
another shall be brought m the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for
ratification of commencement of the action by or joinder or substitution of, the
real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have
the same effect as if the action had been commenced m the name of the real
party in interest.
(d) Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or more
persons associated m any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other association, not a corporation, transact such business under a
common name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they
m a y sue or be sued by such common name. Any judgment obtained against the
association shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the same
m a n n e r as if all had been named parties and had been sued upon their joint
liability The separate property of an individual member of the association may
not be bound by the judgment unless the member is named as a party and the
court acquires jurisdiction over the member
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a
nonresident person is associated in and conducts business within the state of
U t a h in one or more places in t h a t person's own name or a common trade name,
and the business is conducted under the supervision of a manager, superintendent or agent the person may be sued in the person's name in any action
arising out of the conduct of the business.
(f) As used in these rules, the term plaintiff shall include a petitioner, and
the term defendant shall include a respondent.
(Amended effective September 1, 1991, April 1, 1998 )
Advisory Committee N o t e . — Paragraph
(d) has been changed to conform to the holding
m Cottonwood Mall Co v Sine, 767 P2d 499
(Utah 1988), which allows an unincorporated
association to sue in its own name The rule
continues to allow an unincorporated association to be sued in its own name. The final
sentence of paragraph (d) was added to confirm
t h a t the separate property of an individual
member of an association may not be bound by
the judgment unless the member is made a
party
Techmcal changes m all paragraphs of the
rule make the terminology gender neutral In

part (c) the word "minor" has replaced the word
mfant," m order to maintain consistency with
recent changes made m Rule 4(e)(2) In Rule 4
an infant is defined as a person under the age of
14 years, whereas the intent of Rule 17(c) is to
include persons under the age of 18 years,
Amendment N o t e s . — The 1998 amendment added Subdivision (f)
Compiler's N o t e s . — Subdivisions (a) and
(b) of this rule are similar to Rule 17(a) and (c),
FRCP
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Guardians, § 75-5101 et seq
Service of process, U R C P 4 .
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FILED
Fourth JudiciaJ District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY,
a non-profit corporation,

1

Plaintiff,
vs.
TREMCO CONSULTANTS, INC., a/k/a
TREMCO LEGAL SOLUTIONS, INC., a
Utah Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1-10,

|
1

Defendants.

RULING Re: 1) PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF AND PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; 2) DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; 3) PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM;
4) PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO
4ND MOTION TO STRIKE
AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH W.
DUNCAN; AND 5) PLAINTIFF'S
RULE 56(f) MOTION
Civil No. 960400497
Honorable Fred D. Howard
District Court Judge

The above-entitled matter having come before the court on Plaintiff s Motion for
Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment 1 lefendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim, Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Affidavit and
Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion; and the court having reviewed the motions and the respective
responses; and the court being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, it now
makes the following ruling:

1

BACKGROUND
This matter arisesfroma dispute between the parties ovci royalty agreements entered into
between Plaintiff and Defendants and SoftSolutions, Inc. As required by the parties' agreements
the case was heard before an arbitrator and judgment was ultimately entered in favor of the
Plaintifl

The decision of the arbitrator as affirmed by this Court was then appealed to the Utah

Supreme Court in the case of SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 2000 UT 46, 1
P.3d 1095. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision of this Court and the arbitrator's
award. Following the Utah Supreme Court decision, Plaintiff began a collection proceeding for
the royalties owed. It is to be noted however, that just prior to the arbitral or s decision,
SoftSolutions w as dissolved with the subject software assets held by Defendant Tremco. Plaintiff
seeks Declaratory Judgment against Tremco alleging that Defendant funded the arbitration and
made affirmative defenses on behalf of SoftSolutions, its sister company.
On July 17, 2000, the Plaintifffiledits Motion to Dismiss Tremco's Counterclaim and
Memorandum in Support. The Defendant responded byfilingits Motion tor Summary Judgment
on August 15, 2000, and its Memorandum in Support and in Opposition. The Plaintiff then filed
its Reply to the above Motionfiledby the Defendant and its Motion for Declaratory Relief and
Partial Summary Judgment and its Memorandums in Support and Opposition to Defendant's
Motion. On October 16, 2000, Plaintifffiledits rule 56(f) Motion for additional time in which to
conduct discovery and its Objection to and Motion lo Slnke Affidavit of Kenneth Duncan. The
Defendant responded on December 4, 2000,filingfour Memorandums in Opposition to the
2

Plaintiffs Motions. Then on September 7, 2001, the Plaintifffiledits Reply in Support of its
Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment. Next, on September 14, 2001,
Plaintiff filed its Reply Memorandums in Support of its Motions for Declaratory Relief, Rule 56(f)
and to Strike. By the Rule 56(f) Motion, Plaintiff moved that if the affidavit of Mr. Duncan is to
be considered by the Court, then it requested an extension of time to conduct and respond to
Defendant's Motion. In the alternative, if its Motion to Strike the affidavit of Mr. Duncan were
to be granted, Plaintiff waived its Rule 56(f) Motion. Plaintiff thenfiledits Notice to Submit for
decision. The parties then argued the issues during a hearing held on April 10, 2002, and the
Court took the Motions under advisement to issue a written ruling.
ANALYSIS
I. Plaintiffs Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment
1II its Motion for Declaratory Relief Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Tremco was involved
in the prior litigation while SoftSolutions was insolvent; and by its involvement it is to be held
liable for the judgment aw arded against SoftSolutions under a theory of Res Judicata and/or
Collateral Estoppel. Defendant refutes Plaintiffs claims and seeks summary judgment of
dismissal contending that the prior litigation was a different case with different parties; and as
such is not binding upon Defendant. Further, Defendant argues that the indemnity agreement
entered into between Defendant and S.T.C. does not make Defendant liable foi a judgment
entered against SoftSolutions.
3

The Defendant as Privy to Prior Proceedings
It is Plaintiffs contention that thefinaljudgment entered against SoftSolutions is binding
upon Defendant as a matter of law. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was privy to the
judgment, and that as a factual issue, privity has been established of record; and, therefore the
Defendant is liable for the judgment. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are
commonly known as claim preclusion and issue preclusion doctrines. In re General
Determination of the Rights to the Use ofAll the Water establishes the required elements for both
issue and claim preclusion. The four elements of issue preclusion are:
(I) the Defendant must have been a party to or in privity with
a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the
prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the
instant action; (iii) the issue in thefirstaction must have been
completely, fully and fairly litigated; and (iv) thefirstsuit must
have resulted in afinaljudgment on the merits.
The three elements for claim preclusion are:
(I) both cases must involve the same parties, their privies or
assigns; (ii) the claim sought to be barred either must have
been presented or have been available to be presented in the
first case; and (iii) thefirstsuit must have resulted in a final
judgment on the merits.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant is liable for the judgment against SoftSolutions because Defendant
has met all of the requirements of issue and claim preclusion. The Court notes that the parties
primarily dispute thefirstrequirement of issue and claim preclusion; and therefore, the Court will
focus its analysis on Plaintiffs assertion that Defendant is liable under a theory of privity. On this
4

subject, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "A person is a privy and thereby bound by the final
order or judgment if the person's interest has or could have been legally represented in the first
action." In ie General Determination ofRights to Use ofAll Water, 982 P.2d at 70. Further, the
Restatement of Judgments states that "A person who is not a party to an action but who controls
or substantially participates in the control of the presentation on behalf of a party is bound by the
determination of issues as though he were a party." Restatement (Second) ofJudgments (second)
§ 39. The United States Supreme Court has added to the discussion of" privity stating,
To preclude partiesfromcontesting matters that they have
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their
adversariesfromthe expense and vexation attending multiple
lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on
judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent
decisions. pFN4 omitted]
These interests are similarly implicated when nonparties
assume control over litigation in which they have a direct
financial or propriety interest and then seek to redetermine
issues previously resolved [FN5 omitted]. As this Court
observed in Souffront v. Compagnie des Sucreries,
217 U.S. 475, 486-487, 30 S.Ct 608, 612,
54 L.Ed. 846 (1910), the persons for whose benefit and at
whose direction a cause of action is litigated cannot be said
to be "strangers to the cause. ...[0]ne who prosecutes or
defends a suit in the name of another to establish and protect
his ownright,or who assists in the prosecution or defense of
an action in aid of some interest of his own... is as much
bound ... as he would be if he had been a party to the record."
SeeSchnellv. PeterEckrich &Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 262,
n. 4, 81 S.Ct. 557, 559, 5 L.Ed.2d 540 (1961);
cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 111, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 1570, 23 L.Ed.2d 129
(1969). Preclusion of such nonparties fails under the rubric
5

of collateral estoppel rather than res judicata because the
latter doctrine presupposes identity between causes of action.
And the cause of action which a nonparty has vicariously
asserted differs by definition from that which he subsequently
seeks to litigate in his own right
See G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22, 29,
36 S.Ct. 477, 480, 60 L.Ed. 868 (1916);
Restatement (Second) ofJudgments § 83, comment b, p. 51
(Tent. Draft *155 No. 2, Apr. 15, 1975); IB Moore P 0.411 [6],
pp. 1553-1554; Note, Developments in the Law-Res Judicata,
65 Harv.L.Rev. 818, 862 (1952).
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 at 154 (1979).
Plaintiff claims that Defendant agreed in writing in the "Tiemco Agi eement "to assume the
indebtedness owing to the Plaintiff. Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that as a result of that
agreement the Defendant was the actual party litigating the claims, and was the party who
undertook the defense of" those claims This it did because at the time the case was being
litigated, SoftSolutions held no remaining assets, had been dissolved, and was unable to defend
itself in litigation. By providing SoftSolutions' defense in I he arbitration Defendant was privy to
the arbitration and the judgment now before the Court. Plaintiff argues that this is because
Tremco and its officers and directors controlled and paid for the litigation and presented its
interests in. the prior" litigation

* riotes that Defendant makes the statement in the

indemnity agreement with S.T.C. that they paid SoftSolution's attorney's fees in the prior action.
The Court is persuaded that as described in Plaintiffs pleadings, Defendant's claims were
presented, or were available for presentation in the earlier litigation. The Defendant's claims
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arose as a result of license agreements with Plaintiff in 1987, 1988 and 1990. Any claims
Defendant may have had should have been considered with the arbitration proceeding of
September 1996. Defendant asserted defenses in the arbitration on behalf of SoftSolutions and,
therefore, was privy to the issues. The Court notes the Defendant's arguments that Plaintiff has
failed to prove Defendant was a party to any agreement to arbitrate; and that the affirmative
defenses raised were for the winding up of SoftSolutions and not for the benefit of the Defend ant.
As such, Defendant ai gues they were not and could not have been raised in the arbitration
proceeding. The Court is unpersuaded by such arguments and concludes that because Defendant
assumed the litigation for the dissolved SoftSolutions, they were privy to the arbitration. Further,
the Defendant's claims arose as a result of rights obtained from license agreements SoftSolutions
entered into with the Plaintiff. The Defendant had ample opportunity pi ior t *»the arbitration
hearing to assert them which the Defendant failed to do. The Court concludes that the
Defendant's interest has been legally represented in thefirstaction and that it was privy to the
prior litigation. As such it is hoiuui bv I ho final judgment
Defendant as Part of an Association
In addition to privity, Plaintiff further argues in its Motion that Defendant is pari of an
association with SoftSolutions and S.T.C. and, therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to enforce its
judgment against all jointly held assets of SoftSolutions or any proceeds from those assets by the
attachment of any11 traceable assets or proceeds of SoftSolutions assets in a supplemental order.
Plaintiff's argument attaches liability to principles who act when SoftSolutions is dissolved. Rule

7

17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that:
...when an association, which is not a corporation, transacts
business under a common name, whether it comprises the
names of the members of the association or not, the
association may be sued by such common name, and the
judgment obtained against the association shall bind the joint
property of all the associates in the same manner as though
all the members of the association had been individually sued.
Plaintiff asserts that with respect to thefinaljudgment entered against SoftSolutions, that
litigation was commenced in 1992 after SoftSolutions was dissolved. At that time the Defendant
was in association with S.T.C, which carried on the business of SoftSolutions, and had created an
association whereby Defendant would defend the interests of SoftSolutions while S.T.C. would
carry on the business interests of SoftSolutions. Later, the Defendant and S.T.C. entered into an
indemnity agreement making Defendant the responsible party for any of Plaintiff s claims pending
a sale of S.T.C. to WordPerfect. Plaintiff argues that because of the association it is entitled to
enforce its judgment against any property in which the participants held a joint interest, including
any proceeds obtained from the sale of S.T.C. to WordPerfect. Defendant maintains that it is not
part of an association with SoftSolutions and that it does not have a joint interest in any property.
Specifically, Defendant asserts that it was not a part of an association known as "SoftSolutions
Association" and that it received or holds no assets in joint interest with either S.T.C. or
SoftSolutions.
The Court is persuaded by Plaintiffs argument. It has previously been established in the
record that Defendant provided the funding for the defense of SoftSolutions in the arbitration.
8

Further, Defendant entered into an indemnity agreement with S.T.C. making itself responsible for
any of Plaintiff s claims pending a sale of S.T.C. to WordPerfect. It is also undisputed that the
officers and directors of Defendant were the same officers and directors of SoftSolutions and
S.T.C. The Court concludes that there is an association present between Defendant, S.T.C. and
SoftSolutions; and, therefore, because the Plaintiff obtained afinaljudgment against SoftSolutions
in an arbitration controlled andfinancedby the Defendant, Plaintiff as a judgment creditor, may
recover property in which the participants of the association have a joint interest including, but
not limited to, proceedsfromthe sale of the assets of S.T.C to WordPerfect.
Plaintiff as Third Party Beneficiary
In addition to its previous legal arguments, the Plaintiff also contends that when a party
agrees to be responsible for a debt owing to another, such an assumption makes the creditor a
third-party beneficiary as a matter of law. As a creditor that was specifically named in the
Defendant's Agreement, the Plaintiff claims to have obtained third-party beneficiary status when
the Defendant agreed to be solely responsible for the Plaintiffs claims. However, the Defendant
defends that a third party has no enforceable rights under a contract unless he is intended as a
beneficiary and that here, the Plaintiff was not such an intended beneficiary. To be an intended
beneficiary "the intent of the contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit must be
clear." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah
1989). The Court has reviewed the Plaintiffs authority andfindsit to be persuasive. The Court
notes that a plain reading of the agreement states "Tremco consents and acknowledges that
9

Tremco is the responsible party with respect to the BYU claims and is solely responsible for the
defense and pursuit of claims with respect to that matter." See January 1994 Agreement
Paragraph C(l). The Court concludes that in the agreement between Defendant and S.T.C, an
intention to create a benefit for the Plaintiff has been persuasively demonstrated. The agreement
provided that Defendant would indemnify S.T.C. if that company was ultimately held liable to the
Plaintiff; and, therefore Plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary of the agreement.
Plaintiffs Fraudulent Transfer Claim
Finally, the Plaintiff claims afraudulenttransfer occurred when SoftSolutions assigned its
rights under the license agreement with the Plaintiff to S.T.C. Under the Utah Code Ann. § 25-61, "afraudulenttransfer is one in which the debtor transfers assets while insolvent for nominal or
no compensation with the intent to delay, hinder, or defraud the creditor." The undisputed factual
recital of the pleadings support that SoftSolutions was insolvent at the time it purported to assign
its contract rights and royalties to S.T.C. Further, because SoftSolutions had no remaining assets
after the transfer of the license, SoftSolutions did not receive anything of value in exchange for
the transfer. Plaintiff asserts that inasmuch as Defendant was involved in an association with
SoftSolutions and S.T.C. and controlled the litigation in which SoftSolutions was involved, by
such activities it defrauded Plaintiff. The Defendant does not refute the allegation that
SoftSolutions was insolvent or that SoftSolutions did not receive any value for the transfer.
However, the Defendant claims that the Plaintiff has failed to show how Defendant is connected
to this transaction and how such transfer wasfraudulent.It is clear however that Defendant
10

controlled SoftSolutions at the time the transfer occurred and that Defendant was associated with
S.T.C. The Court concludes in the face of Plaintiff s claims, Defendant asserted control over
SoftSolutions and aided thefraudulenttransfer between SoftSolutions and S.T.C. SoftSolutions
havingfraudulentlytransferred its assets to S.T.C. with S.T.C. later selling those same assets to
WordPerfect in exchange for valuable proceeds, the Court grants Plaintiff right to levy execution
on all S.T.C. sale proceeds received by any party having knowledge of Plaintiff s claims prior to
the sale of S.T.C. to WordPerfect.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs Motion for Declaratory Relief and
Partial Summary Judgment with right of a supplemental order against SoftSolutions for
attachment of assets or proceeds of SoftSolutions.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
The Defendant argues that the undisputed facts establish Plaintiff has no valid basis to hold
the Defendant liable; and, therefore its Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
Specifically, the Defendant contends that the arbitration proceeding between the Plaintiff and
SoftSolutions was a different case and the three separate agreements entered into between
Plaintiff, SoftSolutions, S.T.C. and Defendant do not render Defendant liable for a judgment
against SoftSolutions. Plaintiff disputes many of the Defendant's alleged undisputed facts recited
in support of its Motion.
The Court has already discussed the question of Defendant's involvement in the original
case and concluded that the Defendant was privy to the prior litigation. Therefore, by the
11

foregoing conclusion the case between Plaintiff and SoftSolutions was not a separate case from
the matter now before the Court.
The Court has also already addressed Defendant's second argument. The Court
concluded that notwithstanding separate agreements, the Defendant is liable for the agreement
between SoftSolutions and Plaintiff because it assumed the defense in the arbitration and agreed
to indemnify S.T.C. against the Plaintiffs claims, therefore, availing itself to be bound by the
judgment entered against SoftSolutions.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court respectfully denies Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
n. Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim
The Defendant has filed two counterclaim causes of action in this case. In thefirst,the
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff breached the 1988 agreement, and in the second cause, the
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under
the 1988 agreement. The Plaintiff claims that the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel
bar the Defendant from advancing its counterclaim. The Court notes that it has previously cited
the elements of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, therefore, the Court will now
proceed with the analysis of each those elements as they pertain to Defendant's Counterclaim.
The Court has examined the issue of whether or not the Defendant was privy to the
previous litigation and has concluded that the Defendant was so. In its previous ruling, the Court
declared that the three licensing agreements, culminating in the 1990 agreement constituted an
12

exclusive agreement. The arbitrator, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court expressly found that
the 1990 agreement did not recognize a distinction between Defendant and SoftSolutions, rather
the agreement treated Defendant and SoftSolutions as a single licensee. Therefore, for reasons
previously stated the Defendant satisfies the privity requirement of both issue and claim
preclusion.
The second element of issue preclusion requires that the issuefromthe prior adjudication
be identical to the current issue. The Defendant claims that the issues are not identical because
the prior adjudication was between Plaintiff and SoftSolutions and not between Plaintiff and
Defendant, and as such, the issues could not have been raised. However, the Court has already
concluded that the Defendant was part of the prior adjudication, and, therefore, had the
opportunity to raise the issue but failed to do so.
Similarly, the second requirement of claim preclusion requires that the claims should or
could have been brought in the previous adjudication. The Court concludes that because the
Defendant was the responsible party that raised various defenses against the Plaintiff and
controlled the litigation, the counterclaims brought in this action could have been brought in the
arbitration proceeding.
The third element of issue preclusion requires that the issues be completely, fully and fairly
litigated in the first action. Defendant claims that they did not have the time nor the opportunity
to bring the counterclaims in the arbitration. However, the Court notes that Defendant had four
full days of arbitration to bring its counterclaims and that the arbitration resulted in a complete
13

decision of all issues presented to the arbitrator. The Court concludes that the issues in the
arbitration were completely, fully and fairly litigated in the arbitration.
Finally, in both issue preclusion and claim preclusion there must have been a final
judgment entered in thefirstadjudication. The Court notes that the case was adjudicated by an
arbitrator, affirmed by this Court, and appealed to the Utah Supreme Court where it was affirmed;
as such, there was afinaljudgment entered in thefirstadjudication.
The Court concludes that each of the elements of both issue and claim preclusion are
satisfied; and, therefore, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar the Defendant's
counterclaim.
In addition to res judicata, the Plaintiff asserts that the statute of limitations has run on the
Defendant's counterclaim. The Defendant's causes of action for breach of contract and breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are governed by a six-year limitation pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. Plaintiff argues that the 1988 agreement was superseded and
replaced by the 1990 agreement, therefore, the limitation on it began on June 1, 1990. However,
the Defendant contends that the 1988 agreement and the 1990 agreements are wholly separate
and, therefore, the counterclaim was in fact timely. The Court agrees with the Plaintiff on the
statute of limitations issue. As the Court has previously stated, the 1990 agreement replaced the
1988 agreement, and, therefore, the counterclaim should have been raised prior to June 1, 1990.
The Defendant requests that if the Court concludes that its counterclaim is time barred,
that the Court offset Plaintiff s judgment with its counterclaims. Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of
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Civil Procedure provides, "when cross demands have existed between persons under such
circumstances that, if one had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have been
set up, the two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each other." The
policy underlying the doctrine in allowing stale defenses to be raised, "is to prohibit a Plaintiff
from delaying his action until the Defendant's defenses have expired under the applicable statute
of limitations." Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d at 1069. The Court concludes that in the present
case the Plaintiff did not delay bringing it's action but timely brought legal action to recover large
royalties owed to it, and, therefore, the Defendant's request for offset is respectfully denied.
For the forgoing reasons, the Court grants the Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendant's
Counterclaims.
III. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Kenneth Duncan and Plaintiffs
Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance
The Plaintiff has moved to strike the affidavit of Mr. Kenneth Duncan arguing that his
affidavit violates the parol evidence rule, contradicts the trial record, is not based on personal
knowledge, and contains statements which are inadmissable conclusions. The Defendant disputes
the Motion.
First, the Court will examine the allegation that Mr. Duncan's affidavit violated the parol
evidence rule. When a written agreement, "is unambiguous and clear on its face, extraneous or
parol evidence should not be admitted." Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983).
Plaintiff contends that paragraphs 14 and 17 of Mr. Duncan's affidavit violate the parol evidence
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rule because they contradict the unambiguous terms of the two contracts. Specifically, Plaintiff
asserts that in paragraphs 14 and 17 Mr. Duncan makes statements that are an inadmissible
attempt to state the intent of the 1990 and 1994 agreements. The intent of the agreements must
be inferred from the language of the documents themselves and notfromMr. Duncan's
statements made years following execution of the agreements. The defendant claims that the
affidavit did not alter any terms of the contracts and therefore does not violate the parol evidence
rule. The Courtfindsthat as described by Plaintiff, paragraphs 14 and 17 of the affidavit do
attempt to alter terms of the contracts which is violative of the parol evidence rule.
Next, the Plaintiff alleges that the affidavit contradicts the record and the law already set
forth in this case. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that paragraphs 9, 16 and 21-22 of the Duncan
affidavit state that Defendant's officers were involved in the arbitration solely in their capacity as
officer's of SoftSolutions; that the Defendant did not exercise control over the arbitration; and
that the Defendant first became a party to this lawsuit when Plaintiff brought this collection suit.
However, the record indicates otherwise. Defendant argues that the record of the previous case is
not binding on the Defendant because it was not joined in the action. As previously stated, the
record established in this matter is binding upon SoftSolutions and its privies. The arbitrator and
this Court held that the 1990 agreement governed the Defendant's rights to use the Dsearch
Algorythm. Further, the statements in the Duncan affidavit are contradicted by the 1994
agreement wherein the Defendant admitted that it had "been involved in defending this action and
has, itself, asserted various claims against the Plaintiff as offsets or absolute defenses."
16

The Plaintiff also contends that the affidavit was not made with the personal knowledge of
Mr. Duncan. An affidavit "must be made on personal knowledge of the affiant, and set forth facts
that would be admissible in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein." Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah
1973). Plaintiff alleges that paragraph 16 of Mr. Duncan's affidavit attests to the intent of various
third party corporate officers who were involved in the arbitration with Plaintiff. The Defendant,
however, states that he is an officer, and as such, he can attest to what occurred during the
winding up of SoftSolutions. Plaintiff contends that even if not parol evidence and/or hearsay, the
affidavit is without proper foundation for Mr. Duncan to testify regarding the intentions and
motivations of the other officers. The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs argument. The affidavit
fails to provide a proper foundation for Mr. Duncan to speak of other officers' intentions and
motivations.
Finally, the Plaintiff alleges that in his affidavit, Mr. Duncan makes many inadmissable
legal conclusions. The law is clear, a witness may not testify concerning the law or make legal
conclusions. Specifically, the Plaintiff contends that the affidavit contains conclusory statements
in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 15, 17 and 21. Having carefully reviewed the allegations and the
statements of the affidavit, it is the Court's view that these statements are indeed inadmissable
conclusions. Such conclusory statements of an affidavit are prohibited as support for a motion.
For the forgoing reasons, the Court grants PlaintifFs Motion to Strike the Affidavit of
Kenneth Duncan. Plaintiff requested opportunity to argue its Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance
17

if the Court denied its Motion to Strike. Having granted the Motion to Strike, the Plaintiffs Rule
56(f) Motion for Continuance is moot.
For the forgoing reasons, and the reasons stated in the pleadings supportive of this
decision, the Court grants the Plaintiffs Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary
Judgment; respectfully denies Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; grants Plaintiffs
Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim; grants Plaintiffs Motion to Strike; and notes
Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance is moot. Plaintiffs counsel is directed to submit an
Order to the Court consistent with this Decision.
DATED this / ^

day of May, 2002.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a nonprofit entity,
JUDGMENT
Judgment Creditor and Plaintiff,
vs.
SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC., a dissolved entity,
Judgment debtor, and
TREMCO CONSULTANTS, INC., a/k/a
Tremco Legal Solutions, Inc., a Utah
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

Consolidated Case Nos.
960400497 ancftromeeeSS-

Hon. Fred D. Howard

On April 10, 2002, a hearing was held in the above captioned case on the pending
motions before the Court including Brigham Young University's ("BYU") motion for partial

Q6puty

summary judgment and declaratory relief, BYU's motion to dismiss Tremco Consultant's
("Tremco") counterclaim and Tremco's cross motion for summary judgment.
Steven W. Call, Herschel J. Saperstein, Bruce L. Olson and Michael D. Mayfield of Ray,
Quinney & Nebeker appeared on behalf of BYU, and Samuel 0. Gaufin and Eric K. Schnibbe of
Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic and Savage appeared on behalf of defendant Tremco. Kenneth
Duncan, Lee Duncan and Alvin Tedjamulia were present in the courtroom but did not make a
formal appearance on the record.
The Court having considered the foregoing pending motions onfilewith the Court, and
having carefully reviewed the memoranda, documents, exhibits and other materials filed with the
Court in support and opposition to the pending motions, and having reviewed the stipulation to
certain facts submitted by the parties, and the Court having made and filed its ruling, dated May
14, 2002, and for other cause appearing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS ADJUDGES AND
DECREES as follows:
1.

BYU's motion for summary judgment and declaratory relief is hereby granted.

2.

The Court declares and adjudges that BYU was a third-party beneficiary of the

written contract made between Tremco and Soflsolutions Technology Corporation ("STC"), that
Tremco assumed responsibility for the claims owing to BYU, that Tremco was indeed a "privy"
to the prior litigation between BYU and SoftSolutions, and that Tremco is therefore bound by
and liable for the 1998 judgment that was made and entered by the Court in that proceeding
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3.

A money judgment is hereby made in favor of BYU and against Tremco, based

upon the 1998 judgment that was heretofore made and entered in favor of BYU, for the
foregoing amounts:
(a) $1,672,467.00 for past royalties owing to BYU;
(b) interest on the sum foregoing sum at the contract rate of 18% per annum, from
July 3, 1996, to the date of the entry of that 1998 judgment, and thereafter at the contract
rate of 18% per annum;
(c) for attorney's fees awarded as a part of the original arbitration award in the
amount of $115,000.00;
(d) interest on the foregoing award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $115,000
from July 3, 1996 to the date of entry of the 1998 judgment at the rate of 7.61%fromJuly
3, 1996 to December 31, 1996 at the rate of 7.81%fromJanuary 1, 1997 to December 31,
1997; and at the rate of 7.23%fromJanuary 1, 1998 to the date of entry of the 1998
judgment and thereafter at the legal rate established by Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4;
(e) for the attorney's fees incurred by BYU at the trial court level on a cost-plus
basis according to the instructions given by the Utah Supreme Court in its published
decision entitled SofiSolutions v. BYU, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000); and
(f) for the attorneys' fees incurred by BYU in connection with the appeal which
was takenfromthe 1998 judgment, with the amount of those fees to be determined on a
cost-plus basis in compliance with the instructions given by the Utah Supreme Court in
its decision entitled SofiSolutions v. BYU, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000);
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4.

BYU's motion to dismiss Tremco's counterclaim is hereby granted, and the Court

hereby dismisses Tremco's counterclaim against BYU with prejudice.
5.

Tremco's motion for summary judgment against BYU is hereby denied.

6.

BYU's motion to strike the Affidavit of Kenneth Duncan is hereby granted.

7.

This Judgment shall be augmented by the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs

incurred by BYU in the collection of this Judgment pursuant to the award of attorneys' fees
provided for in the 1998 judgment, which was based upon the attorneys' fees provisions set forth
in the underlying licensing agreements.
8.

In accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court

hereby determines that there is no just reason for delay in the entry of this Judgment made
against Tremco, and therefore the Court hereby instructs the Clerk of the Court to enter this
Court's Judgment without unnecessary delay. The Courtfindsthat the reasonableness of
attorneys fees to be determined in Case No. 960400597, on a cost-plus basis as directed by the
Utah Supreme Court, and the reasonableness of attorneys fees in Case No. 000400088 present no
just reason for delay in the enforcement of the other terms of this Judgment.
DATED this / %

day of June, 2002.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a nonprofit entity,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
Judgment Creditor and Plaintiff,
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Vo.

SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC , a dissolved entity,
Judgment debtor, and
TREMCO CONSULTANTS, INC., a/k/a
Tremco Legal Solutions, Inc., a Utah
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

Consolidated Case Nos.
960400497 and 000400088

Hon. Fred D. Howard

On April 10,2002, a hearing was held in the above captioned case on the pending
motions before the Court including Brigham Young University's ("BYU's") motion for

supplemental relief wherein BYU sought a supplemental order to assist it in the collection of the
money judgment made and entered in favor of BYU by this Court, as modified by the Utah
Supreme Court. Herschel J. Saperstein, Steven W. Call, Bruce L. Olson and Michael D.
Mayfield of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker appeared on behalf of BYU, and Samuel O. Gaufin and
Eric K. Schnibbe of Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic and Savage appeared on behalf of Tremco Legal
Solutions, Inc. a/k/a Tremco Consultants, Inc. (hereinafter "Tremco"). Kenneth Duncan, Lee
Duncan and Alvin Tedjamulia were present in the courtroom but did not make a formal
appearance on the record.
The Court having considered BYU's motion for supplemental relief sought in connection
with the collection of the money judgment heretofore made by this Court, as modified by the
Utah Supreme Court in its decision in the matter of SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young
University, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000), (hereinafter the "Judgment"), and having carefully
reviewed the memoranda, documents, exhibits and other materialsfiledwith the Court, and
being fully aware of the prior rulings, proceedings, orders and judgments made in the case and
for cause appearing therefor, the Court hereby makes itsfindings,conclusions and supplemental
order as follows:
FINDINGS
The following facts are determined to be undisputed or established because they have not
been lawfully controverted or because they have been established by the prior proceedings in the
case including but not limited to the prior rulings, orders, judgments and decisions made in this
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case. Some of the findings that relate to the organization of Utah business entities are
established by public record.
1.

On April 10,2002, BYU's motion for supplemental relief which sought, in part, a

supplemental order in connection with the enforcement of this Court's Judgment came on for
hearing before the Court. No opposition to the motion was made by anyone on behalf of
SoftSolutions, Inc. and therefore the dispositive facts set forth in BYU's memoranda in support
of the motion are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 4-501 (2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration and/or pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.

In 1988, a corporation by the name of KAL, Inc. was organized under Utah law.

Thereafter, the name of the corporation (hereinafter the "Corporation") was changed to
"SoftSolutions, Inc." in June of 1989.
3.

Kenneth Duncan, Lee Duncan and Alvin Tedjamulia (hereinafter "Duncan,

Duncan and Tedjamulia"), owned and controlled the Corporation when it was dissolved as a
corporate entity on November 1,1992 for failing to comply with Utah law. At no time after its
dissolution was the Corporation ever reinstated by the Utah Division of Corporations, and the
time for reinstatement under Utah law has long expired, {see Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1422(1)).
4.

After the involuntary dissolution of the Corporation by the State of Utah, Duncan,

Duncan and Tedjamulia, the prior shareholders and officers of the Corporation, together with the
dissolved corporation and STC1, continued to carry on the Corporation's business through the

1.
At all relevant times, Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia were also the officers and
directors of a company called SoftSolutions Technology Corporation (hereinafter "STC") which
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use of the Corporation's assets including but not limited to the valuable license rights which the
Corporation had obtained from BYU under a series of licensing agreements.
5.

At no time after the dissolution of the Corporation were the affairs of the

Corporation wound-up, nor were its assets liquidated and used to pay the claims owing to BYU.
Rather, the dissolved Corporation, Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia and STC continued to
market products under the license agreements which were in the name of the Corporation.
Indeed, the Judgment made and entered by the Court was based in part upon the royalties which
were generated by the licenses after the dissolution of the Corporation.
6.

The records of the State of Utah reflect that KWD Associates L.C. was organized

as a limited liability company by Kenneth Duncan with him as the sole manager and registered
agent or about November 11, 1993, that Julee Associates L.C. was organized by Lee Duncan,
with him as the sole manager and registered agent, on or about November 8, 1993, and that AST
Associates, L.C. was organized as a limited liability company by Alvin Tedjamulia, with him as
the sole manager and registered agent, on November 2, 1992. (The foregoing limited liability
companies are herein referred to as the "DDT companies".)
7.

On about January 10,1994, immediately before the sale to WordPerfect, Duncan,

Duncan and Tedjamulia, who were the officers of Tremco, caused Tremco to make and enter
into an agreement with STC wherein Tremco agreed to be responsible for the claims owing to

they also owned and controlled directly, or through the limited liability companies which they
organized shortly before the sale of STC to WordPerfect.
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BYU under the licensing agreements. Duncan, Duncan, Tedjamulia and Tremco took full
control of the litigation concerning the BYU claims.
8.

Shortly after the foregoing agreement was made, Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia

caused STC together with those assets which had belonged to the Corporation prior to its
dissolution including but not limited to the licensing rights obtained from BYU, to be sold to
WordPerfect for several millions of dollars.
9.

In connection with the foregoing sale Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia caused the

proceeds from the sale to WordPerfect to be paid to the DDT companies, which Duncan, Duncan
and Tedjamulia organized shortly before the sale. The checks issued by WordPerfect, which
were produced to BYU by Novel pursuant to subpoena, reflect $13,525,779 in payments to the
DDT Companies as follows: $8,514,855 to KWD; $1,423,437 to JULEE and $3,587,487 to AST.
10.

Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia did not cause any of the foregoing sale proceeds

to be used to pay the claims owing to BYU or the Judgment that was made and entered by this
Court.
11.

In 1996, the unincorporated association, which then consisted of at least Duncan,

Duncan and Tedjamulia and the dissolved corporation, voluntarily commenced the above
captioned legal action against BYU in Case No. 960400497.
12.

On July 8, 1998, this Court made and entered its Judgment against the

unincorporated association in favor of BYU in the amount of $1,672,467, plus interest thereon,
for attorneys fees of $115,000, plus interest thereon, and for additional attorneys fees in the
amount of $28,987.50, plus interest thereon.
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13.

Thereafter, the unincorporated association appealed this Court's judgment to the

Utah Supreme Court, and on May 19,2000, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the Judgment of
this Court in the matter of SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah
2000), with the exception that the high Court vacated and remanded the award of attorney fees in
the amount of $28,987.50 with instructions that the reasonableness of the in-house attorneys fees
incurred by BYU should be determined on a "cost-plus" basis, as described by the Court. The
Utah Supreme Court also awarded BYU further attorneys' fees which it incurred on appeal with
the reasonableness of those fees to be determined also on a cost-plus basis.
14.

On or about March 25, 2002, a written stipulation was filed with the Court

wherein Duncan, Duncan and TedjamuHa admitted that they directed and controlled the litigation
with BYU, that they were the officers of Tremco, and that Tremco paid the attorneys' fees in
connection with the BYU litigation.
15.

The Judgment, which was made and entered by this Court as modified by the

Utah Supreme Court, remains entirely unsatisfied.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
16.

Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that "[wjhen two

or more persons associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other
association, not a corporation, transact such business under a common name, whether it
comprises the names of such associates or not, they may sue and be sued by such common name.
Any judgment obtained against the association shall bind the joint property of all the associates
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in the same manner as if all had been named parties and had been sued upon their joint liability."
(Id.)
17.

Based upon the foregoing rule of law, the Court concludes that it should make and

enter an order that the Judgment heretofore made and entered by this Court is binding upon all of
the joint property of all associates of the unincorporated association in the same manner as if all
such associates had been named parties and been sued upon their joint liability. The joint
property includes all property which the Corporation or the subsequent unincorporated
association owned including all proceeds obtained from the sale made to WordPerfect by
Duncan, Duncan & Tedjamulia and/or the DDT companies.
18.

Rule 69(s) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "the Court... may

order any property of a judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in the possession of the
judgment debtor or any other person, or due to the judgment debtor, to be applied towards the
satisfaction of the judgment."
19.

Based upon the foregoing rule of law, the Court concludes that it should make and

enter an order that all property of the unincorporated association and/or any proceeds or benefits
received therefrom which are in the possession Duncan, Duncan & Tedjamulia, the DDT
companies, or any other person who had notice of BYU's claims should be applied towards the
satisfaction of this Court's Judgment.
20.

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408 provides that a judgment against a dissolved

corporation may be enforced against the shareholders of the dissolved entity if assets have been
distributed to the shareholders provided that the shareholder's liability under the foregoing
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section shall not exceed the total value of the assets distribution to them, as that value is
determined at the time of distribution.
21.

Based upon the foregoing statute, this Court's Judgment may be enforced against

Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia to the extent of the value of the assets which Duncan, Duncan
and Tedjamulia received from the Corporation. Those assets include the license rights and
products which belonged to the Corporation but which Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia caused
to be transferred to WordPerfect in connection the sale made to WordPerfect for valuable
consideration. As such, this Court's Judgment may be enforced against Duncan, Duncan and/or
Tedjamulia to the extent of the value of the assets which they received from the sale made to
WordPerfect, including the value of the stock and/or the payments which were made to the DDT
Companies, which Duncan, Duncan & Tedjamulia caused to be organized shortly before the sale
to WordPerfect.
22.

This Court's Judgment may also be enforced as against all proceeds obtained by

Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia from the sale made to WordPerfect or against the property
purchased therewith including but not limited to the approximate $13,525,779 which Duncan,
Duncan and Tedjamulia caused to be paid to each of the DDT Companies, which Duncan,
Duncan and Tedjamulia caused to be organized shortly before the sale.
23.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that those who engage in business may be

jointly and severally liable for the debts of a dissolved corporation. See Murphy v. Crosland,
915 P.2d 491, 495 (Utah 1996)("[b]ecause Grassland Industries' corporate status was not
subsequently reinstated, Todd Crossland is personally liable for the default judgment entered
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against the corporation.") See also Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995), (a person
who purports to act for and on behalf of a corporation that has no corporate authority is
personally liable).
24.

Based upon the foregoing case authority, the Court hereby concludes that the

shareholders of the Corporation, including Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia, are jointly liable for
the debts and obligations incurred by the unincorporated association. Therefore, the Court
should order that BYU may levy execution on all of the assets of the unincorporated association
including but not limited to the proceeds or benefits received by Duncan, Duncan and
Tedjamulia from the sale to WordPerfect, including but not limited to the money paid to the
DDT Companies.
26.

For these and other reasons, the Court concludes that it should make and enter a

supplemental order to assist BYU in the collection of the Judgment that was made and entered by
this Court on July 7,1998, as that Judgment was modified and affirmed by the Utah Supreme
Court in its decision entitled SoftSolutions v. BYU, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000).

ORDER
Based upon the findings, conclusions, judgments and other proceedings in the case, and
for cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

BYU's motion, which seeks supplemental relief in connection with the

enforcement of this Court's Judgment, is hereby granted.
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2.

This Court's Judgment is binding on the joint property of the members of the

unincorporated association, as if all had been named parties and had been sued upon their joint
liability pursuant to Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The joint property includes
all proceeds received from the sale made to WordPerfect or the traceable proceeds obtained
therefrom including but not limited to the $13,525,779 in money paid by WordPerfect to
Duncan, Duncan & Tedjamulia or the DDT Companies, which Duncan, Duncan & Tedjamulia
caused to be organized shortly before the sale.
3.

All property of the unincorporated association, including but not limited to all

proceeds received from the sale to WordPerfect by Duncan, Duncan & Tedjamulia directly or by
the DDT Companies, or the traceable proceeds obtained therefrom which is in the possession of
the judgment debtor, Duncan, Duncan and/or Tedjamulia, the DDT Companies, and/or by any
other person who had notice of BYU's claims shall be applied to satisfy this Court's Judgment.
4.

This Court's Judgment may be enforced jointly against Duncan, Duncan and

Tedjamulia, the prior shareholders of the Corporation, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a1408 to the extent of the value of all sale proceeds received by them directly and/or through the
DDT Companies which they caused to be organized shortly before the sale to WordPerfect. This
Court's Judgment may also be enforced directly against the sale proceeds paid by WordPerfect to
Duncan, Duncan and/or Tedjamulia directly or the DDT Companies, and may be enforced
against the property which has been purchased with the traceable proceeds therefrom.
5.

Any writ of execution or writ of garnishment issued in connection with this

Court's Judgment and this Supplemental Order shall be accompanied by & Request for Hearing
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which a person may file with the Court to obtain a heanng before the Court in connection with
such execution or garnishment.
DATED this /£)

day of

C/7f/.Y

, 2002.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the c * /

day of June, 2002 a true and correct copy of the

foregoing proposed SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER was served by U.S. mail, first class postage
prepaid, upon SoftSolutions, Inc., an unincorporated association, in care of Tremco Consultants
Inc., by serving:

Samuel O. Gaufin
Eric K. Schnibbe
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE
50 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Attorneys for Tremco Consultants Inc.

655225v2
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of

, 2002 a true and correct copy of

the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER was mailed by U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid,
to the following:
Steven W. Call
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Brigham Young University
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
Samuel O. Gaufhi
Eric K. Schnibbe
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE
Attorneys for Tremco Consultants Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84144

655225v2
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Software licensee sought declaiatory judgment
vacating or modifying arbitrator's award to licensor
m dispute iegaiding royalties foi licensing of search
engine, and licensor brought motion to confirm the
award The Distiict Court, Provo Department, Fred
D Howaid, J, confirmed the award Licensee
appealed The Supreme Court, Wilkms, J, held
that (1) as a matter of fust impression, a successful
litigant who is not pnmanly engaged in providing
legal sei vices may lecovei attorney fees when
lepresented by salaried m-house counsel, (2)
attorney fee for in-house counsel is based on
cost-plus rate encompassing actual salaries and
dnect oveihead costs, and (3) award of royalties on
licensee's sales of products that did not use the
licensed search engine did not exceed the
aibitiatoi's authonty
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
West Headnotes

Page 1

|3] Arbitration €=>57.1
33k57 1 Most Cited Cases
| 3 | Arbitration €=>61
33k61 Most Cited Cases
For a court reviewing an arbitration award to
determine that an arbitrator exceeded his authority,
a court must (1) review the submission agreement
and determine that the arbitrator's award covers
areas not contemplated by the submission
agieement, oi (2) determine that an award is
without foundation in reason or fact U C A 1953,
78-31a-14(l)(c)
|4| Arbitration €==>57.1
33k57 i Most Cited Cases
Arbitrator's rephrasing of submitted issues of what
amount of royalties was earned under software
licensing agreement and what amount had been paid
did not give arbitratoi unbounded jurisdiction to
determine any issue relating to royalties, and thus,
arbitrator did not exceed his authority
(5| Arbitration €=>57.1
33k57 1 Most Cited Cases
Arbitrator's award of royalties on software licensee's
sales of products that did not contain the licensed
search engine was within scope of submitted
questions regarding amount of royalties due and
whether use of the
intellectual
property
discontinued so that potential royalties stopped
accruing

| 1 | Arbitration €=>73.7(1)
33k73 7(1) Most Cited Cases

|6| Arbitration €==>61
33k61 Most Cited Cases

In reviewing the oider of the district court
confirming, vacating, or modifying an arbitration
award, the Supreme Court grants no deference to
the court's conclusions of law, reviewing them for
conectness

Arbitrator's determination that software licensor
was entitled to royalties on licensee's sales of
products that did not contain the licensed search
engine, because licensee deprived licensor of
potential royalties by discontinuing use of the
search engine in its products, was a rational
interpretation of the software licensing agreement

|2| Arbitration €=^73.7(1)
33k73 7(1) Most Cited Cases
The Supreme Court reviews the district court's
findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard
when reviewing the court's order confirming,
vacating, or modifying an arbitration award

|7| Copyrights and Intellectual Property €=^107
99k 107 Most Cited Cases
Software licensee's affiliated company remained an
"affiliate" of the licensee, within meaning of
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software licensing agreement entitling licensor to
royalties on sales by licensee's affiliates, after sale
of control of the affiliated company to a third party.
|8| Arbitration €==>57.1
33k57.I Most Cited Cases
Arbitrator's award of royalties on sales by licensee's
affiliate, after sale of control of the affiliated
company to a third party, was within scope of
submitted issue of the amount of royalties owed to
licensor.
|9| Arbitration €=>61
33k61 Most Cited Cases
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without licensor's written consei it, as not
terminating licensor's right to receive royalties,
where licensee failed to return the licensed search
engine technology and licensor had no notice of
licensee's sale of a controlling interest in licensee's
affiliate,
113 j Costs €=> 194.32
102k 194.32 Most Cited Cases
If a contract provides for attorney fees, the award is
allowed only in accordance with the terms of the
contract.
114) Arbitration €=>42
33k42 Most Cited Cases

Arbitrator rationally interpreted software licensing
agreement as allowing the parties to waive the
one-year contractual limitations period through their
conduct, though another provision of the agreement
required modifications or waivers to be in writing.
110| Arbitration €=>57.1
33R57.1 Most Cited Cases

Software licensor, which was not an organization
primarily engaged in providing legal services, was
entitled to recover contractual attorney fees for its
use of its salaried in-house counsel in an arbitration
proceeding regarding a royalty dispute with 11 1151 Costs €=>l 94.46
102kl 94.46 Most Cited Cases

Arbitrator's award of royalties after purported
automatic termination of software licensing
agreement based on licensee's ceasing to carry on
its business was within scope of submitted questions
regarding amount of royalties due and whether use
of the licensed search engine in licensee's products
was discontinued so that potential royalties stopped
accruing.
1111 Arbitration €=>61
33R61 Most Cited Cases
Arbitrator
rationally
• .:--;piei<.~
automatic
termination provision <
software
licensing
agreement, which by its terms was applicable if
licensee ceased to carry on its business, as being
inapplicable where licensee discontinued its use of
the licensed search engine in its products, thereby
depriving licensor of potential royalties.
' i l. \ ri-itration C=>61
33K61 Most Cited Cases

A successful litigant who is not primarily engaged
in providing legal services may recover attorney
fees when represented by salaried in-house counsel
116| Costs €=> 194.18
102k 194.18 Most Cited Cases
A cost-plus rate encompassing actual salaries and
direct overhead costs, rather than the fair market
value for similar services from a comparably
experienced outside lawyer, is the more reasonable
measure of attorney fees to in-house counsel.
|17| Costs €^194.10
102k 194.10 Most Cited Cases
I he basic purpose of attorney fees is to indemnify
the prevailing party, not to punish the losing party
by allowing the winner a windfall profit,
|18| Costs €=> 194.18
102k 194.18 Most Cited Cases

Arbitrator gave a rational interpretatioi i to
automatic termination provision of software
licensing agreement, which was applicable if
licensee's sale of its business transferred the license
Copr. © V

Attorney fees for in-house counsel are limited to
consideration actually paid or for which the party is
obligated, calculated using a cost-plus rate and
t, Vv orks
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taking into account: (1) proportionate share of the
party's attorney salaries, including benefits, which
are allocable to the case based upon the time
expended, plus (2) allocated shares of the overhead
expenses, which may include the costs of office
space, support staff, office equipment and supplies,
law library and continuing legal education, and
similar expenses.

"I 1 Appellant Softsolutions, Inc., appeals from an
order of the district court denying its motion to
vacate or modify an arbitration award and granting
appellee Brigham Young University's (BYU)
motion to confirm the arbitration award. We affirm
the district court's order confirming the arbitration
award, but we remand the case to the district court
to recalculate its award of attorney fees in light of
this opinion.

119] Costs €==>207
102k207 Most Cited Cases
The party seeking recovery of attorney fees for
in-house counsel has the burden of proving the
amounts used to >:^' ::-.:,v. cost-plus rate for
counsel.
[20| Arbitration €=^>42
33k42 Most Cited Cases
Arbitrator
reasonably
applied
attorney
fee
provisions in software licensing agreement when
awarding attorney tees for licensor's use of its
in-house counsel, though the arbitrator failed to
calculate attorney fees under a cost- plus rate
encompassing actual salaries and direct overhead
costs.
|21| Arbitration €=>42
33k42 Most Cited Cases
District court abused its discretion by failing to
calculate attorney fees under a cost-plus rate
encompassing actual salaries and direct overhead
costs, when making attorney fee award to software
licensor for licensor's use of its in-house counsel in
post-arbitration proceedings.

f 2 This case arises as a result of a series of
software licensing agreements entered into between
1987 and 1990 by BYU and Softsolutions, the last
of which was executed on June 1, 1990 (the
Agreement). The Agreement provided that BYU
would give Softsolutions an exclusive license to use
its software technology called D-Search in
exchange for royalty payments. The Agreement
mandated mediation followed by arbitration for
resolution of any contractual disputes.
% 3 The arbitration provision of the Agreement
expressly set forth the scope of the arbitrator's
powers and prohibited the arbitrator from "add[ing]
to, subtracting] from or modifying] any of the
terms or conditions'1 of the Agreement. [FNl] The
Agreement provided that in the event of arbitration,
the prevailing party was to "be paid by the other
party - a reasonable sum for attorneys' fees and
costs." Another provision of the Agreement *1098
also provided that Softsolutions was to "pay all
reasonable collection costs at any time incurred by
BYU in obtaining payment of amounts past due,
including court costs, expenses associated with
litigation, and reasonable attorneys' fees, whether or
not suit was commenced by BYU."

|22| Appeal and Error C=?984(5)
30k984(5) Most Cited Cases
Appellate court reviews the district court's award of
attorney fees under an abuse of discretion standard.
*1097 Earl Jay Peck, Clark R. Nielsen, David B.
Hartvigsen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff,
Eugene H. Bramhall, David B. Thomas, Provo, for
defendant.

WILKINS, Justice:
Copr. © \\ • .• M< :
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FNl. Paragraph 15.1 of tl le Agreement
provided in part:
Except as to issues relating to the validity,
construction or effect of any patent
licensed, the parties must, with respect to
any
and
all
claims,
disputes
or
controversies arising under, out of, or in
connection with this Agreement, attempt in
good faith to resolve those claims, disputes
or controversies by negotiations between
the parties. In the event either party
believes the negotiation discussions are not

1 P.3d 1095
396 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 2000 UT 46
(Cite as: 1 P.3d 1095)
likely to result in settlement, the parties
must,
in good faith,
participate in
mediation sessions with a mediator to be
mutually selected by the parties and the
expense of which is to be paid 50 percent
by each party. In the event, after one or
more mediation sessions, either party
believes the mediation process is not likely
to
resolve
the
dispute
by
mutual
agreement, the dispute shall he resolved by
final and binding arbitration in Provo.
Utah. Each party shall choose one
arbitrator and these two arbitrators shall in
turn select a third arbitrator, which three
arbitrators shall constitute the arbitration
panel. The arbitrators
shall have no
power to add to, subtract from or modify
any of the terms or conditions of this
Agreement.
(Emphasis added.)

U 4 Almost immediately after the Agreement was
executed and Softsolutions began using D-Search, a
dispute arose between the parties concerning
various competitors infringing on the patented
software. When negotiations failed, the matter was
submitted to mediation, as required by the
Agreement. In July 1993, Softsolutions removed
D-Search from its products and replaced it with
another technology. In January 1994, WordPerfect
purchased the stock of Softsolutions Technology
Corporation (STC), an affiliate of Softsolutions,
WordPerfect was later acquired by Novell.
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pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-14(l)(c) and
78-3 la- 15(l)(b) (1996). Softsolutions claimed
that the arbitrator exceeded the powers granted to
him under the terms of both the Agreement and the
Submission Agreement or, alternatively, had based
the award on matters not submitted to him. In
response, BYU filed a motion with the court to
confirm the arbitration award pursuant to section
78-3la-12 of the Utah Code. The parties then
stipulated to consolidate the actions and agreed that
the two motions would be treated as cross-motions.
11 7 On February 10, 1998, the district court
denied Softsolutions' motion to vacate or modify the
arbitrator's award, ruling that the arbitrator did not
exceed his powers or base the award on a matter not
submitted by the parties for arbitration. In so
ruling, the district court adopted the arbitrator's
description of the arbitrable issues. The district
court granted BYU's motion to confirm the
arbitration award, relying on Utah Code Ann. §
78-3la-12 (1996). The district court subsequently
entered its judgment on July 7, 1998, awarding
BYU $28,987.50 in additional attorney fees for the
work of its in-house counsel in the action before the
district court. The court based this calculation on
what it determined was the current market rate of
$150 per hour charged by attorneys engaged in
similar
private
practice.
The
entire
award
including the. additional attorney fees totaled
$1,816,454.50, plus interest. Softsolutions appeals.
ISSUES AND M ' S N I U K D S 1 H> MV li .">,'
1] 8 Softsolutions presents two issues on appeal.
First, it argues that the district court erred in
denying its motion to vacate or n lodify the
arbitration award because the arbitrator exceeded
his jurisdiction by arbitrating matters not included
in the parties' Submission Agreement oi the
Agreement.

1| 5 In February 1994, BYU initiated arbitration
proceedings. In preparation for the arbitration,
counsel for both parties prepared and submitted to
the arbitrator a joint statement of issues to be
arbitrated
(the
Submission
Agreement).
Arbitration ensued, and in July 1996, the arbitrator
entered his arbitration award, granting BYU
$1,672,467 in royalties and $115,000 in attorney
fees. The award gave BYU royalties on -sales made
prior to March 1996. In his decision, the arbitrator
described the issues submitted for arbitration in a
fashion different from that included in the
Submission Agreement of the parties.

H 9 Second, Softsolutions argues that the district
court improperly awarded attorney fees to BYU for
its in-house attorneys. Specifically, it argues that
the attorney fees are non-recoverable as a matter of
law, but that even if they are recoverable, the
amount awarded is excessive and unreasonable.

K 6 Thereafter, Softsolutions filed an action for
declaratory judgment in the district court seeking to
have the arbitration award vacated or modified

K 10 "1 o a significant degree, our decision turns on
application of the correct standard of review by the
district court and by this court in reviewing the
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district court's decision. There are two standards
applicable to the review of arbitration awards. In
Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Sail Lake Trappers, Inc.,
925 P.2d 941, 947-48 (Utah 1996). we described
both the standard to be applied by the district court
and that to be used by an appellate court to review
the district court's *1099 proceedings. The
standard of review for a trial court "is an extremely
narrow one" giving " 'considerable leeway to the
arbitrator,' " and setting aside the arbitrator's
decision " 'only in certain narrow circumstances.' "
Id. at 947 (quoting First Op/ions v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 943, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 131 L.Ed.2d
985 (1995)). The trial court "may not substitute its
judgment for that of the arbitrator, nor may it
modify or vacate an award because it disagrees with
the arbitrator's assessment." Id.
fj J J When, as here, the award is challenged on
the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his or her
authority, the trial court applies a two-pronged test.
First, "to find that an arbitrator has exceeded his
authority, a court must review the submission
agreement and determine whether the arbitrator's
award covers areas not contemplated by the
agreement." Id. at 949, 115 S.Ct. 1920. If not,
there is one additional limited circumstance under
which the arbitrator's award may have exceeded his
authority. The second prong to be applied by the
trial court is to determine whether an award is "
'without foundation in reason or fact.' " 'id. at 950,
115 S.Ct. 1920 (quoting Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Central Ga. Ry, 415 F.2d 403, 411-12
(5th Cir. 1969)). This second prong is referred to
as the "irrationality principle" and is based on the
"assumption ... that the parties, by their agreement
to arbitrate, have given the arbitrator the authority
to decide their dispute on a rational basis." Id.
[1][2] ^ 12 In reviewing the order of the district
court confirming, vacating, or modifying an
arbitration award, we grant no deference to the
court's conclusions of law, reviewing them for
correctness. We review the district court's findings
of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. More
specifically, our "scope of review is limited to the
legal issue of whether the trial court correctly
exercised its authority in confirming, vacating, or
modifying an arbitration award." Intermountain
Power Agency v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 961 P.2d
320, 323 (Utah 1998). Additionally, "[wjhether
attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a
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question of law, which we review for correctness."
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah
1998). However, the district court has "broad
discretion in determining what constitutes a
reasonable fee, and we will consider that
determination
against
an
abuse-of-discretion
standard." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d
985,991 (1 Itah 1998)
!

ANALYSIS
• : '^RATION AV

"'

% 13 Softsolutions maintains that the district court
should have vacated or modified the arbitration
award based upon either of two statutory grounds:
the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 78- 31a-14(l)(c) (1996), or
the arbitrator based the award on a matter not.
submitted to him, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
78-31a-15(l)(b) (1996). Under both grounds,
Softsolutions argues that the arbitrator erred by (1)
rephrasing and essentially enlarging the first issue in
the Submission Agreement, (2) awarding royalties
on sales of Softsolutions' software products that did
not contain D-Search technology, (3) awarding
royalties on software sales made by non-afflliates of
Softsolutions, (4) disregarding the one-year
limitation period in the Agreement, and (5)
awarding royalties on software sales made after the
Agreement had automatically terminated by its own
terms..Softsolutions maintains that any one of these
errors standing alone was a sufficient basis for the
district court to either vacate or modify the award.
H 14 Hie Utah Arbitration Act, §§ 78-31 a-1 to -20
(the Act), governs the arbitration process. "The Act
supports arbitration of both present and future
disputes and reflects long-standing public policy
favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of
adjudicating disputes." Allred v. Educators Mitt.
Ins. Ass'n of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996)
"[T]he standard for reviewing an arbitration
award is highly deferential to the arbitrator." Buzas,
925 P.2d at 946; see also Intermountain Power
Agency, 961 P.2d at 323. Generally, " 'an
arbitration award will not be disturbed ... because
the court does not agree with the award as long as
the proceeding was fair and honest and the
substantial rights of the parties were respected.' "
*1100Buzas, 925 P.2d at 947 (quoting DeVore v.
IHC Hosps., Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994)
). Moreover, "[g]iven the public policy and law in
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support of arbitration, judicial review of arbitration
awards confirmed pursuant to the Act is limited to
those grounds and procedures provided for under
the Act" Alfred, 909 P.2d at 1265.
[3] U 15 Under the Act, a court must vacate an
arbitration award if it appears that "the arbitrators
exceeded their powers." Utah Code Ann. §
78-31a-14(l)(c) (1996). For a court reviewing an
arbitration award to determine that an arbitrator
exceeded his authority, a court must (1) review the
submission agreement and determine that the
"arbitrator's award covers . areas not contemplated
by the submission agreement," or (2) determine that
an award is " 'without foundation in reason or fact.'
" Buzas, 925 P.2d at 950 (two-pronged Buzas test)
(quoting R.R. Trainmen, 415 F.2d at 41i- 12); see
also Intermountain Power Agency?, 961 P.2d at 323
("Whether the court agrees with the arbitrator's
judgment is irrelevant, as long as the arbitrator
construed and applied the contract in an arguably
reasonable manner and acted fairly and within the
scope of his authority,"'). [FN2 ]

FN2. In Intermountain Power Agency, we
stated:
[A]n arbitrator exceeds his or her powers if
the arbitrator strays beyond the scope of
the questions submitted for arbitration by
the parties. The scope of the parties'
dispute as defined in their written
agreement to arbitrate establishes the
scope of the arbitrator's authority in
resolving the conflict. An arbitration
awarding purporting to resolve questions
beyond that jurisdictional boundary is not
valid. For a court to find that an arbitrator
has exceeded his or her delegated
authority, the court must determine that
"the arbitrator's award covers. areas not
contemplated
by
the
submission
agreement." In addition, an arbitrator
exceeds his or her delegated power if the
arbitration award has no " 'foundation in
reason or fact' " and is, therefore, "
'completely irrational.'"
961 P.2d at 323 (citations omitted).

^| 16 1he Act requires a court to modify an
arbitration award if it appears that "the arbitrators'
Com

'i

WVN

~(JI

— ' ,. .

award is based on a matter not submitted to them, if
the award can be corrected without affecting the
merits of the award upon the issues submitted."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-15(l)(b) (1996). We
now address Softsolutions' claims of error under
these statutory grounds.
A. Rephras ing of th e Subm iss ion Agreem ent
[4] 1| 17 First, Softsolutions argues that the district
court erred in refusing to vacate or modify the
award because the arbitrator erroneously recast the
eight
issues
submitted
to
the
arbitrator.
Softsolutions argues that by restating the first and
primary issue submitted for decision, the arbitrator
improperly obtained unfettered jurisdiction to
determine any matter relating to royalties, whether
based upon the contract or not. In other words,
Softsolutions argues that the arbitrator exceeded the
scope of his jurisdiction by deleting terms and
modifying others to add royalty obligations not
found within the terms of the Agreement We
disagree.
•fl 18 The first issue charged the arbitrator with
determining: "What amount of royalties were
earned under the D-Search licensing agreement(s)
with BYU; and what amount has been paid?" The
arbitrator refrained this question into "What amount
of royalties are due BYU by Softsolutions, Inc.?"
The district court also adopted this wording. We
are not convinced that the rephrasing of this issue,
or any other presented for our review, gave the
arbitrator "unbounded jurisdiction" to determine
any issue relating to the royalties, as Softsolutions
suggests. Rather, the arbitrator stayed within the
confines of the first question submitted for
resolution. Specifically, the arbitrator stated that
"Softsolutions is indebted to BYU in the amount of
$1,672,467" as a result of the D-search technology,
and that Softsolutions did not make royalty
payments as dictated in the contract. This ruling,
although framed differently than the question
submitted for resolution, certainly addresses what
royalties were earned and the amount paid by
Softsolutions. Because the arbitrator ruled on the
matter submitted for resolution and did not stray
from the scope of authority delegated to him by the
parties, this challenge presents no basis to vacate or
modify the arbitration award.
• - - M-. // d o* Royalties on Software Products
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that Did Not Contain DSearch Technology
[5][6] "J] 19 Second, Softsolutions argues that the
district court erred in refusing to vacate or modify
the
award
because, despite
finding
that
Softsolutions discontinued D-Search in July 1993,
the arbitrator erroneously imposed royalties on the
sale of Softsolutions' products that did not contain
D-Search technology, contrary to the express terms
of paragraph 4.1 A of the Agreement.
\ 20 Paragraph 4.1 A of the Agreement provided
that Softsolutions was obligated to pay BYU
[a]n earned royalty in an amount equal to five (5)
percent of the Net Sales of the Licensed Products
or Licensed Processes used, leased or sold by or
for Softsolutions and its Affiliates, including
packaged software products, custom software
applications
containing
the
Licensed
Process(es) and the support of custom software
applications
...
containing
the
Licensed
Process(es).
Accordingly, under the Agreement, royalties were
imposed only on Softsolutions' products which
actua! 1 y co nta i ned D- Search tech n o 1 ogy.
1] 21 One question submitted by the parties read:
"Was use of D-Search discontinued so that potential
royalties stopped accruing? If so, when?" Another
question read: "What amount of royalties were
earned under the D- Search licensing agreement(s)
with BYU; and what amount has been paid?" The
arbitrator concluded: "Softsolutions did not need to
replace the technology of D-Search; therefore,
Softsolutions could not avoid royalty payments by
using a substitute search engine. D-Search was
capable of performing if Softsolutions fully
understood the technology of D-Search and
implemented the technology accordingly." As
such, the arbitrator awarded BYU royalties on sales
of Softsolutions' software which did not contain
D-Search technology.
\
22 Softsolutions
argues (1) that the
jurisdictional question limited the arbitrator's
authority only to deciding whether the use of
D-Search was discontinued so that potential
royalties stopped accruing and when, and (2) that by
awarding royalties from the sales of products not
containing D-Search, the arbitrator ignored both the
Submission Agreement and sections 4.1 and 15.1 of
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the Agreement.
1] 23 In refusing to vacate the awai d. the disti id:
court reasoned:
Under the License Agreement-Paragraph 3.1,
"Softsolutions shall, during the term of this
agreement, use its best efforts to bring one or
more Licensed Products or Licensed Processes to
the market through a thorough, vigorous and
diligent program designed to commercially
develop the Licensed Technology to its full
market potential."
Given an express
contractual duty to use D- Search under the
Exclusive License Agreement and a finding that
Softsolutions did not need to replace D-Search,
an award on sales which should have contained
D-Search is not irrational and is derived in a
logical way from the wording of the contract.
Additionally, the court finds an award of royalties
on sales after July, 1993 falls squarely within the
questions submitted by both parties in the Joint
Statement of Issues to be Arbitrated by Arbitrator
Rokich. Ihe questions submitted included a
question as to the amount of royalties due BYU
by Softsolutions, Inc., and the arbitrator was
specifically charged with determining whether the
use of the intellectual property discontinued so
that royalties stopped accruing.
(Emphasis omitted.)
^| 24 .We conclude that the district court properly
applied the two-pronged test in Buzas in
determining whether to vacate the arbitration award
on this basis. Certainly, the issue of whether to
award royalties on sales before or after D-Search
was removed falls within the ambit of issues
submitted by the parties for resolution—that is, the
questions regarding the amount of royalties BYU
earned as well as whether the D-Search was
discontinued. Moreover, the award is based on a
rational interpretation of the Agreement. As such,
the district court did not err in refusing to vacate the
award
under
section
78-3 la-14(l)(c).
Additionally, the district court properly refused to
modify
the award
*1102
under
section
78-31 a-15( 1 )(b), as this issue was submitted for
decision.
C. Royalties on Software Sales Made After the 1994
Stock Sale
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district court erred in refusing to vacate or modify
the award because the arbitrator ignored express
provisions in the Agreement by awarding S935,000
in royalties on software sales made by
"non-affiliates"
of
Softsolutions.
namely,
WordPerfect and Novell. Essentially, Softsolutions
argues that royalties on sales by WordPerfect and
Novell were not "earned" under paragraph 4.1 A of
the Agreement because these companies were not
"affiliates" of Softsolutions, as defined by
paragraph 1.1 of the Agreement. Softsolutions
maintains that its royalty obligations ceased when
STC, an affiliate of Softsolutions, was purchased by
WordPerfect on January 24, 1994, and was later
acquired by Novell. However, STC remained an
"affiliate" even after the sale of control of STC to
WordPerfect and eventually to Novell,
*,| 26 Furthermore, the parties' Agreement
described which sales were subject to royalties.
Paragraph 2.1 of the Agreement provided:
BYU hereby grants ... Softsolutions the ... right
and license to utilize the Licensed Technology,
specifically identified as D-Search ... until such
time as this agreement is terminated. This grant
will extend to the manufacture, sale, lease,
transfer or other disposition of Licensed Products
or Licensed Processes through an Affiliate.
T| 27 Paragraph 4.1 A of the licensing agreement
provided that "Softsolutions shall pay to BYU an
'earned' royalty in the amount of five (5) percent of
the Net Sales of the Licensed Products or Licensed
Processes used, leased or sold by or for
Softsolutions and its Affiliates"
[8] \ 28 In denying Softsolutions' motion to
vacate the arbitrator's award, the district court
considered the two factors set forth in Buzas. ft
determined that the first prong in Buz as was met
because one of the issues to be arbitrated was the
amount of royalties Softsolutions owed to BYU. It
found that an award based on royalties before or
after January 24, 1994, was well within this
question. Moreover, the court found that award
was not "irrational or inconsistent" with the wording
of the Agreement to award royalties.
Tl 29 We agree with the district court that there is
no basis to vacate the award under section
78-31a-14(l)(c) of the Utah Code. The arbitrator
clearly stayed within the confines of the Submission
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Agreement, and his ruling had a foundation in
reason and fact. Therefore, the district court did
not err in determining that the arbitrator did not
exceed his powers. Moreover, we agree with the
district court that because this matter falls within the
issues submitted for arbitration, there was no basis
for the district court to modify the award under
section 78-31a-l 5(1 )(b) of the Utah Code.
D. One-Year Contractual Limitation Period
% 30 Fourth, Softsolutions contends the district
court erred in refusing to vacate or modify the
award because the arbitrator essentially modified,
subtracted from, and added to the terms of the
Agreement by finding that the parties waived
paragraph 12.5 of the Agreement, which terminated
all of BYU's claims not brought within one year
after discovery of the cause of action. Specifically,
Softsolutions argues that because BYU brought the
arbitration action on February 4, 1994, all royalties
accruing before February 1993 should be barred by
the one-year limitation period, as mandated by
paragraph 12.5 of the Agreement, and that in
finding that the parties waived the one-year
provision, the arbitrator improperly disregarded
paragraph 20.6 of the Agreement, which explicitly
requires all modifications or waivers of the
Agreement to be in writing.
^| 31, The Agreement provided: "No action.,
regardless of form, arising out of the transaction
subject of this Agreement may be brought by either
party more than one year after the cause of action is
discovered." The Agreement further said: "No
modification or claimed waiver of any of the
provisions of this Agreement shall be valid unless in
writing
* 1103 and signed
by authorized
representatives of the party against whom such
modification or waiver was sought to be enforced."
Moreover, paragraph 15.1 of the Agreement
provides that the arbitrator "shall have no power to
add to, subtract from or modify any of the terms or
conditions of this Agreement."
T[ 32 The parties' Submission Agreement charged
the arbitrator with determining whether "BYU's
claims for royalties due [were] barred by a
contractual limitation period[.] If so, what is the
period and when does it begin to run?" In
answering this question and in determining the
amount of earned royalties, the arbitrator found that
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the parties, by their own conduct, had waived the
one-year
contractu a 1 i i in. itat i on
period,
I Ih e
arbitrator stated:
[T]he contractual limitation period was waived by
BYU and Softsolutions because of their ongoing
negotiations to resolve the written complaints
raised by Softsolutions. It was evident to the
arbitrator from the evidence, exhibits, testimony
and the conduct of the witnesses that the
contractual limitation period should not bar BYU
from collecting royalty payments that are found to
be due and owing.
The arbitrator did not address the written waivei
requirement of paragraph 20.6.
1] 33 In determining whether to vacate the award
based on this alleged error, the district court applied
the two-pronged test in Buzas.
The court
determined that the first prong in Buzas was met
because the parties submitted the contractual
limitation issue to the arbitrator. We agree that the
court did not exceed its authority on this basis. In
considering the second prong of Buzas, whether the
arbitrator's actions were "without foundation in
reason or fact," the district court said:
The court recognizes the standard set forth in
Buzas is that the arbitrator cannot add to,
subtract from or modify any terms of the License
Agreement. In this case, however, the arbitrator
found that the parties (BYU and Softsolutions)
themselves by their own conduct modified/waved
[sic] the License Agreement, and this court may
not substitute its own judgment for that of the
arbitrator. The court does not read Buzas to hold
that if the parties themselves modify the License
Agreement by their conduct, the arbitrator must
ignore such conduct in favor of express
contractual
language.
Additionally,
by the
language of Buzas it would not be irrational or
inconsistent with the wording of the License
Agreement for the arbitrator to conclude/interpret
that paragraph 20.6 is capable of being modified
by the parties themselves. The arbitrator is
charged with interpreting the contract, and it was
not irrational or inconsistent with the License
Agreement as modified by the conduct of the
parties to find that the limitation period had been
waived by BYU and Softsolutions,
[9] \ 34 Hence, the issue we must determine is
whether the court's finding of waiver, in light of the
provision requiring waivers to be in writing, is
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irrational as a matter of law, and thus requires us to
vacate the award because the arbitrator exceeded
his authority. We conclude that the district court
correctly concluded that the arbitrator acted
rationally. Here, the arbitrator did not subtract
from, add to, or modify the Agreement, which
would certainly be improper. Rather, the arbitrator
interpreted the contract as permitting the parties
themselves
to
modify/waive
the
contractual
limitation period, despite the express contractual
language to the contrary. We do not find this
interpretation of the Agreement to be irrational or
inconsistent with the law in this state. See Provo
City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806
(I Jtah 1979) ("It is true that parties to a written
contract may modify, waive, or make new
contractual terms, even if the contract itself contains
a provision to the contrary."); see also Ted R.
Brown & Assoes. v. Carries Corp., 753 P.2d 964,
968 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (parties to a contract may,
by mutual consent, modify any or all of the contract,
even if the contract contains provision to the
contrary). As such, the district court: did not ei i in
refusing to vacate the award. Moreover, because
this matter was submitted by both parties for
decision as reflected by the Submission Agreement,
the district court properly denied Softsolutions'
modification request.
*1104 E Automatic Termination of the Agreement
[10] % 35 Fifth, Softsolutions argues that the
district court erred in refusing to vacate or modify
the award because the arbitrator erroneously
awarded royalties on software sales made after the
Agreement had automatically terminated by its own
terms. Specifically, Softsolutions argues that the
Agreement
automatically
terminated
under
paragraph 14.2D and E, on January 24, 1994, if not
earlier, and by awarding royalties on sales after this
date, the arbitrator blatantly exceeded his powers.
% 36 Paragraph 14.2 provides:
This Agreement shall be terminated automatically
in the event of occurrence of any one of the
fo 11 ow i ng c i reu m stan ces :

D. in the event Softsolutions shall cease to cany
on its business; or
E. In the event that there is a transfer or sale of
the Softsolutions' business purporting to transfer
or assign this Agreement or licensed technology
without the prior express written consent of BYU;
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except as otherwise permitted herein.
1) 37 The arbitrator did not explicitly address the
automatic termination provision of 14.2 in making
the arbitration award. However, in assessing
whether the award should be vacated, the district
court stated that the first prong of the Buzas test was
met because the arbitrator was charged with
determining the amount of royalties Soitsolutions
owed BYU as well as determining whether the use
of D-Search was discontinued so that royalties
stopped accruing. In essence, the district court
determined that an award which included royalties
for periods before and after January 24, 1994, fit
squarely within the Submission Agreement. We
agree.
[11] H 38 In addressing the second prong of Buzas,
the district court recognized that the arbitrator did
not give detailed reasons on this issue, but indicated
that in arbitration law, arbitrators are not required to
provide detailed reasons for every facet of their
award. We agree. The court determined that the
arbitrator did not act irrationally or inconsistently
with paragraph 14.2D of the Agreement because the
arbitrator could have found that the stock sale of
STC to WordPerfect did not mean STC "ceased to
carry on business" under 14.2D. This is a rational
interpretation.
[12] U 39 With respect to Softsolutions' claim that
the arbitrator exceeded his authority by disregarding
paragraph 14.2E, given the sale of Soitsolutions'
business, STC, which purported to transfer or assign
the licensed technology to WordPerfect without
BYU's consent, the court found that the arbitrator
did not act irrationally or inconsistently. It based
its ruling on the following rationale: (1) The
arbitrator could have reasonably found a violation
of paragraph 14.5 in that STC failed to return
D-Search after the stock sale to WordPerfect, (2)
paragraph
14.2 (the automatic
termination
provisions) must be viewed in context with
paragraph 14.5 (requiring the return of D-Search in
the event of termination), (3) BYU had no notice of
the stock sale because of the violation of paragraph
14.5, and therefore (4) Softsolutions cannot claim
termination under 14.2E to avoid royalty payments,
yet exclusively possess D- Search in violation of
paragraph 14.5 of the Agreement. We conclude
that this analysis also meets the test of reasonabiiity
and rationality under Buzas. As such, the district
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court did not err in refusing to vacate the award on
this basis. Furthermore, because the issue of
earned royalties was submitted for decision, the
court properly refused to modify the award.
II. ATTORNEY FEES
1j 40 Softsolutions appeals BYU's award of
attorney fees. Specifically, Softsolutions contends
that attorney fees are non-recoverable as a matter of
law because BYU was represented by in-house
counsel, and even if the fees are recoverable, they
are excessive and unreasonable. As a threshold
matter, we consider whether this issue was properly
preserved for appeal. BYU argues that the issue of
the recoverability of fees for an in-house attorney
was not raised below and should be summarily
rejected. BYU argues that Softsolutions raised
only the issue of reasonableness and excessiveness
of the attorney *1105 fee award in its complaint for
declaratory judgment. However, in Softsolutions'
objection to the form of proposed judgment,
Softsolutions raised the issue of whether "attorney
fees may be awarded to in- house counsel." The
district court specifically addressed this issue,,
concluding that
in-house counsel is entitled to charge the same
rates as independent outside counsel for similar
litigation because there has been no persuasive
evidence presented which would indicate that the
operation of in-house counsel does not incur
similar overhead expenses. In addition, the court
finds no compelling reason as to why BYU
should not be entitled to attorney's fees at a rate
which it would have cost BYU to litigate this
matter with comparable outside counsel had they
had to hire such, especially when the contract,
controlling statutes, and case law support such an
award.
As such, tliis issue is properly before us.
A. In-House Counsel Fees
[13] U • H "li i I Jtah, attorney fees are awardable
only if authorized by statute or by contract." Dixie
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988. If a
contract provides for attorney fees, the award "is
allowed only in accordance with the terms of the
contract." Id In this case, the parties' Agreement
provided for "reasonable attorney fees." [FN3]
Attorney fees are also authorized by the Utah
Arbitration Act, section 78-3 la-16 of the Utah Code.

Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Page 11

1 P.3d 1095

396 Utah Adv. Rep. 14. 2000 UT 46
(Cite as: 1 P 3d 1095)
[FN4]
FN3. The Agreement provided;
Softsolutions shall also pay all reasonable
collection costs at any time incurred by
BYU in obtaining payment of amounts
past due, including court costs, expenses
associated with litigation, and reasonable
attorneys' fees, whether or not any suit was
commenced by BYU.
In the event suit or an arbitration
proceeding is commenced to construe or
enforce any provision of this Agreement,
the prevailing party, in addition to all other
amounts to which such party may be
entitled, shall be paid by the other party a
reasonable sum for attorneys' fees and
costs.
(Emphasis added.)

FN4. Section 78-3la-16 provides:
An award which is confirmed, modified, or
corrected by the court shall be treated and
enforced in all respects as a judgment.
Costs incurred incident to any motion
authorized by this chapter, including a
reasonable attorney's fee, unless precluded
by the arbitration agreement, may be
awarded by the court.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-16 (1996).
lj 42 Softsolutions maintains that our decisions in
Jones, Waldo, Hoi brook & McDonough v. Dawson,
923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996), and Smith v. Batchelor,
832 P.2d 467 (Utah 1992), prohibit awarding
attorney fees to BYU because BYU was
represented by in-house counsel. Essentially,
Softsolutions argues that our decisions in Jones,
Waldo and Batchelor stand for a blanket prohibition
of attorney fee awards to pro se litigants, thus
precluding BYU from obtaining attorney fees as a
matter of law.
^j 43 In Batchelor, we held that a pro se
attorney-litigant is not entitled to recover attorney
fees for successful litigation. See Batchelor, 832
P.2d at 473. Likewise in Jones, Waldo, we held
that a pro se law firm- litigant could not recover

attorney fees in enforcing an agreement. See
Jones, Waldo, 923"P.2d at^ 1375. \n refusing to
award attorney fees in these cases, we focused on
the important fact that the litigants were both in the
business of providing legal services and thus did not
"incur" attorney fees as a lay individual or nonlegal
organization would. See Jones, Waldo, 923 P.2d at
1375 (stating "[i]t is by no means self-evident that
the time a lawyer spends on his own case represents
fees 'incurred' "). That is, neither the law firm nor
the attorney-litigant actually paid or became liable
to pay consideration in exchange for legal
representation and thus did not incur attorney fees
in the action. It was not the fact that they were pro
se that precluded them from recovery. Rather, it
was the fact that they were lawyers representing
themselves, and therefore did not incur attorney fees.
[14] % 44 1 his case is different. BYU is
represented in this matter without the aid of outside
legal counsel. However, BYU is not an
organization primarily engaged in providing legal
services, and as such, the issue is whether a
nonlegal organization can recover *1106 attorney
fees when it uses the services of salaried in-house
con n se 1. We ho Id i n th e a ffi rin at i ve.
[15] ^ 45 Tliei e are no prior Utah cases directly
on point. However, we are persuaded by the ample
authority from other jurisdictions that a successful
litigant who is not primarily engaged in providing
legal services may recover attorney fees when
represented by salaried in-house counsel. [FN5]
Such an award is still limited to those occasions
when the contract between the parties, a statute, or
other rule of law otherwise entitles a party to
recover attorney fees, but removes the previously
perceived distinction between in-house and private
counsel

FN 5. See generally Central States,
Southeast & Areas Pension Fund v.
Central Cartage Co., 16 F.3d 114, 115-16
(7th Cir. 1996) (permitting attorney fees to
staff attorneys of nonlegal organization);
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for
Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 762 F.2d 272,
278 (3d Cir. 1985)" (permitting award of
attorney fees to nonlegal entity represented
by in-house counsel despite case law
holding pro se litigant ineligible for
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attorney fees); Milgard Tempering, Inc. v.
Selas Corp. of Am., 761 F.2d 553, 557-58
(9th Cir. 1985) (stating attorney fees should
be permitted to in-house counsel of
nonlegal organization so long as counsel
actively participated in matter); Textor v.
Board of Regents, 711 F.2d 1387, 1396
(7th Cir. 1983) (permitting attorney fees for
salaried in-house counsel of universities);
National Treasury Employees Union v.
United States Dep't of Treasury, 656 F.2d
848, 853 (D.C.Cir.1981) (permitting award
of attorney fees to lay organization
utilizing
in-house counsel); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 521
F.2d
317 (D.C.Cir.1975) (permitting
attorney fees award for services of
in-house counsel of union); Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,
281 F.2d 538, 542 '(3d Cir. 1960)
(permitting attorney fee award to glass
company when litigation was conducted in
part by in- house attorneys); PPG Indus.,
Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co.,
840 F.2d 1565, "l570 (Fed.Cir.1988)
(permitting attorney fee award to nonlegal
corporation when litigation conducted in
part by in-house counsel); Goodrich v.
Department of Navy 733 F.2d 1578, 1579
(Fed.Cir.1984) (permitting attorney fee
award when lawyer was employed by
union); Holmes v. NBC/GE, V68 F.R.D.
481, 482 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (permitting
award of attorney fees for nonlegal entity's
in- house counsel); Scott Paper Co. v.
Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 604 F.Supp. 835.
837 (D.Del. 1984) (permitting award of
attorney fees for services by paper
company's in-house counsel); Brisbane v.
Port
Auth.,
550
F.Supp.
222
(S.D.N.Y.1982) (permitting attorney fees
to port authority for work by in-house
counsel); Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 410 F.Supp. 63, 65
(D.D.C.1975) (granting attorney fees to
non-profit
consumer
educational
organization
when
litigation
was
conducted by in-house salaried attorneys);
B-E-C-K Constructors, Inc. v. State, 604
P.2d 578, 585 (Alaska 1979) (stating
"where a party is represented by both
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private counsel and in-house counsel who
actively participate in the preparation of
the case, the party may recover partial fees
for both private and in-house counsel"):
Trope v. Katz, 11 CaUth 274, 45
Ca!.Rptr.2d 241, 902 P.2d 259, 271 (1995)
(recognizing modern trend to allow
attorney fees to litigant represented by
in-house counsel); In re Trust Known as
Great N. Iron Ore Properties, 31 1 N.W.2d
488, 492-94 (Minn. 1981) (permitting
attorney fee award to nonlegal entity for
services of in-house counsel); Dale Elec,
Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 205 Neb. 115, 286
N.W.2d 437, 443 (1979) (permitting
attorney fee award to electronics company
using
in-house
counsel);
Tesoro
Petroleum Co. v. Coastal Ref. c£ Mktg.,
Inc.,
754
S.W.2d
764,
766-67
(Tex.Ct.App.1988) (concluding award of
attorney fees for services of coastal
refining corporation's in-house counsel was
proper and did not violate public policy or
code of professional responsibility); 20
Am.Jur.2d Costs § 59 (1999) (recognizing
attorney fee award to in- house counsel).
But see Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710
F.2d 1480, 1499 & n. 13 (11th Cir.1983)
(dictum implied all attorney fees clauses
under Florida law are indemnification
provisions and do not include payment for
in-house counsel expenses).

If 46 This rule is a reasonable means of
compensating an organization for legal expenses it
actually incurred, unlike the litigants in Jones,
Waldo and Batchelor. That is, BYU, as a nonlegal
entity, was required to pay consideration for the
legal services received from its in-house counsel in
the form of salary and other costs of employment.
The litigants in Jones, Waldo and Batchelor did not
actually pay or become liable to pay consideration
in exchange for representation. We hold that BYU,
as the successful party, was entitled to attorney fees
for the legal services of its in-house counsel.
B. Amount of Attorney Fee Award
f 47 We now consider Softsolutions' argument
that the awarded amount is unreasonable and should
be vacated and remanded to the district court to
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determine a reasonable fee based on the actual
salary of counsel and direct overhead costs
(cost-plus rate), not on prevailing market rates
charged by outside counsel (market rates).

rate is consistent with the rate customarily charged
in the locality for similar services and that it should
consider any other circumstances which it deems
necessary. See Dixie, 164 P.2d at 990.

*1107 U 48 In this case, the arbitrator awarded
BYU $115,000 in attorney fees based upon a $150
per hour market rate. The district court agreed and
awarded BYU an additional $28,987.50 for
post-arbitration litigation, also based upon a $150
per hour rate. In determining a reasonable award
of attorney fees, both the arbitrator and the district
court considered the factors enumerated in Dixie
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990. [FN6]

[16][17] <J 51 Courts that have considered what is
a reasonable attorney fee award for services of
in-house counsel have, in some cases, awarded fees
using a cost-plus rate. [FN7] Other courts have
employed a market-rate formula. [FN8] We are
convinced that a cost-plus rate is the more
reasonable measure of attorney fees to in-house
counsel, and is consistent with the public polic> that
the basic purpose of attorney fees is to indemnify
the prevailing party and not to punish the losing
party by allowing the winner a windfall profit. See
Jones, Waldo, 923 P.2d at 1375 (indicating attorney
fee awards are means to " 'vindicate personal
claims' " rather than means to " 'generate fees' "
(quoting Falcone v. Internal Revenue Serv., 714
F.2d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 1983))).

FN6. In Dixie, we stated that in
determining a reasonable fee a district
court should find answers to four
questions:
1. What legal work was actually
performed?
2. How much of the work performed was
reasonably
necessary
to
adequately
prosecute the matter?
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent
with the rates customarily charged in the
locality for similar services?
4. Are there circumstances which require
consideration
of
additional
factors,
including those listed in the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
764 P.2d at 990 (footnotes omitted).
U 49 Like the district court, BYU maintains that
most courts have endorsed an award of attorney fees
to in-house counsel by computing the value of their
services in the same manner as fees are computed
for outside counsel; that is, fair market value for
similar services from a comparably experienced
outside lawyer. By contrast, Softsolutions argues
that if any fees should be awarded, a cost-plus rate
should apply.
U 50 In Dixie, we did not draw the narrow
distinction between a reasonable fee award based
upon the use of in-house or outside counsel, and we
have yet to address this issue in other cases.
Indeed, in Dixie we held that in computing a
reasonable attorney fee, a district court should
consider, among other things, whether the billing

FN7. See, e.g., PPG, 840 F.2d at 1570;
Goodrich, 733 F.2d at 1579; NTEU, 656
F.2d at 853; Lacer v. Navajo County, 141
Ariz.
392,
687
P.2d
400,' 404
(Ct.App.1984).
FN8. See, e.g., Centra! States, 76 F.3d at
115-16; Milgard, 761 F.2d at 558
(indicating modern trend is to award
attorney fees for in- house counsel based
on the "market rate"); Environmental
Defense Fund v. EPA, 672 F.2d 42. 50
(D.C.Cir. 1982); see also Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 892-96, 104 S.Ct. 1541,
1545-47,
79
L.Ed.2d
891
(1984)
(indicating reasonable attorney fees under
federal statute are to be calculated
according to prevailing market rates in
relevant community, not according to cost
of providing legal services, regardless of
whether prevailing party is represented by
private
profit-making
attorneys
or
nonprofit legal aid organizations).

[18][19] 1| 52 To assist the district court on
remand, we set forth general guidelines to be
considered in making such an award. Fees for

Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

1 P.3d 1095
396 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 2000 UT 46
(Cite as: 1 P.3d 1095)
in-house counsel are limited to consideration
actually paid or for which the party is obligated,
calculated using a cost-plus rate and taking into
account (1) the proportionate share of the party's
attorney salaries, including benefits, 'which are
allocable to the case based upon the time expended,
plus (2) allocated shares of the overhead expenses,
which may include the costs of office space, support
staff, office equipment and supplies, law library and
continuing legal education, and similar expenses.
See Lacer, 687 P.2d at 404. The party seeking
recovery of fees has the burden of proving these
amounts.
]\ 53 Turning to the case at hand, we draw a
distinction between the attorney fees awarded by the
arbitrator and reviewed by the district court, and
those fees awarded by the district court for
post-arbitration proceedings. The scope of review
differs.
*1108 [20] H 54 We look first to the arbitrator's
award of attorney fees, totaling $115,000. In Bazas
we stated that the role of a district court and this
court in the review of an arbitrator's factual finding
is severely limited. See Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt
Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 948 (indicating
trial court "does not sit to hear claims of factual or
legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court
does in reviewing decisions of lower courts").
Indeed, "whether the [district or this] court agrees
with the arbitrator's judgment is irrelevant, as long
as the arbitrator construed and applied the [attorney
fees provision of the] contract in an arguably
reasonable manner and acted within the scope of his
authority." Inter mountain Power Agency v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 961 P.2d 320, 323. Because the issue
of attorney fees was clearly submitted to the
arbitrator, and because the arbitrator reasonably
applied the attorney fee provisions in the
Agreement and acted within the authority delegated
to him by the parties, we will not disturb this
portion of the award.
[21][22] \ 55 Next, we turn to the district court's
award of post- arbitration attorney fees totaling
$29,987.50. We review the district court's award
of attorney fees under an abuse of discretion
standard. See Dixie, 764 P.2d at 991. Because the
district court did not apply the rule of law relating
to the proper measure of attorney fees recoverable
by a nonlegal organization for the use of in-house
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim
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counsel, we vacate that portion
award and remand the case to
redetermine post-arbitration
in-house counsel consistent with

of the attorney fees
the district court to
attorney fees for
this opinion.

U 56 Finally, we address BYU's request for
attorney fees on appeal. BYU has prevailed in this
action, and therefore, we award it reasonable
attorney fees incurred in this appeal, the amount to
be determined by the trial court on remand, using
the cost-plus rate.
CONCLUSION
U 57 In sum, we affirm the district court's denial of
Softsolutions' motion to vacate or modify the
arbitration award, and grant of BYU's motion to
confirm the arbitration award. Moreover, we hold
that attorney fees are recoverable for the services of
in-house counsel of nonlegal entities when
otherwise provided for by contract, statute, or other
rule of law. The district court properly concluded
that attorney fees were recoverable in this instance
for the services performed by BYU's in-house
counsel. Although the arbitrator did not calculate
attorney fees under a cost-plus rate, given the trial
court and this court's narrow scope of review on this
issue, we do not disturb the arbitrator's attorney fee
award. However, given our broader scope to
review the trial court's post-arbitration fee award,
we hold that the court exceeded its discretion in
computing the attorney fee award by using a
market-rate formula rather than a cost-plus rate. As
such, we vacate that portion of the attorney fee
award and remand to the district court for the
limited purpose of calculating post-arbitration
attorney fees, including those fees incurred on
appeal, in accord with this opinion,

U 58 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief
Justice RUSSON, Justice DURHAM, and Judge
ORME concur in Justice WILKINS' opinion.
% 59 Having disqualified himself, Justice
DURRANT does not participate herein; Court of
Appeals Judge GREGORY K. ORME sat.
1 P.3d 1095, 396 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 2000 UT 46
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